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Abstract
Transportation systems pose some of the most intractable challenges to sustainable,
climate-friendly cities. As the fastest growing source of greenhouse-gas emissions,
transportation is critical to sustainability. Yet transportation planning is complex,
involving dynamic, multi-modal systems, and requiring the collaboration of multiple
jurisdictions. Efforts to implement a more sustainable transportation system, therefore
typically confront multiple barriers. This thesis examines a 20-year process to establish
a light-rail system in Seattle, Washington to explore the opportunities for and obstacles
to devising sustainable metropolitan transportation systems.
4
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for the support of many friends and family who have helped me make it
through two incredible years. Thank you to all who have provided fun and loving care for
Diego. You have made what was a difficult balance between family and grad school far
easier. To David, thank you for your patience and steadfast support. I would not have
made it without you.
Thank you also to the many people who have enriched my experience at DUSP. I am
especially grateful to my advisor Judy Layzer, for her patient, thoughtful, and detailed
feedback. You have pushed me to be a better writer and challenged me to be a better
activist. Learning from Fred Salvucci, my reader, has been a real honor. Your many
stories about transportation planning informed and inspired this thesis. I owe deep
gratitude to Larry Susskind and Herman Karl for their support and for providing the
opportunity to come to MIT through the MIT-USGS Science Impact Collaborative.
Finally, I would like to thank the people I interviewed from Seattle, who were generous
with their time and thoughtful with their insights.
This thesis is dedicated to Diego, my favorite companion on train rides long and short.
Te quiero mucho mss que mucho.
6
Contents
Introduction ...........................--....--------------------------------------------------------------............................................... 11
The Emerald City: An Overview ......................................-----------------------................................................... 19
Case Overview ..........................................------------------------------------------------............................................... 22
Rapid Transit Gets Its Start .........................................------. ------------------------............................................... 23
Growth Management and the Regional Transit Authority (1990-1993) ............................................. 25
The RTA Ballot Measure (March 1995)....................-.............------------------..... 30
The Sound Move Ballot Measure (November 1996)....................................................37
Implementation Challenges (1997-2005) ..............................................---------------.... 48
Organization Building......................................--. ------------------------------------............................................... 48
Challenges from the ballot box..............................- .. .-----------.................................................. 52
The Dark Days ........................................-------------------------------------------------................................................ 56
Sound Transit ......................................................................... 62
Roads and Transit Ballot Measure (November 2007)......................................64
Sound Transit Il Ballot Measure (November 2008) .................................... 70
Epilogue.........................--..-...-----..---------------------------------------------------------------............................................... 76
Conclusions.....................................................................................................7
References .................................................................. 84
List of Interviews.......................................................................-94
8
Waiting for the Interurban: The Politics of Light-Rail Planning in Seattle
A popular sculpture in Seattle commemorating the Interurban rail line, which
connected downtown Seattle with its outer suburbs. After the transit service was
terminated in 1939, Seattle residents would wait 70 years before boarding
another interurban light rail train in the region.
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We have reached a unique juncture in human ecological history, one requiring a radical
reconfiguration of planning values and goals. The "ecological footprint" of the global
economy is already larger than the planet, yet a quarter of humanity still lives in poverty,
the human family is expanding by 90 million a year, and material demands everywhere
are rising. An unlikely tenfold reduction in the energy and intensity of economic activity
would be required to accommodate anticipated economic growth safely, posing an
enormous challenge to planners in facilitating the transition to sustainability. Failure
enhances the considerable possibility of global disaster.
William Rees, 1995
Introduction
With growing scientific consensus on the projected severity and impact of climate
change, the global ecological disaster referenced ominously by Rees fifteen years ago
seems more than a "considerable possibility." For sustainability advocates, recent
indications that climate change has progressed faster than anticipated have only
heightened the sense of urgency to reverse the devastating trend in greenhouse gas
emissions (Parks 2009; Sommerkorn and Hassol 2009). And increasingly, city planners
and policymakers are enacting plans with explicit reference to climate protection.
The salience of climate change as a political issue has prompted the adoption of
climate plans by cities around the globe. In the U.S., over 1000 municipalities have
signed the Conference of Mayors' Climate Protection Agreement (CPA), pledging a 7
percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2012-the target
for the U.S. established in the Kyoto Protocol. Launched in 2005 by Seattle Mayor Greg
Nickels, the CPA was intended to prompt both local commitments to climate protection
and pressure for federal policy change. The unexpected enthusiasm for Nickel's CPA
campaign indicates that at the local level, the debate is no longer focused on whether
climate change is happening but rather what is the appropriate response.
Nearly a decade before the launch of the CPA, planning theorist Scott Campbell
suggested that "In the battle of big public ideas, sustainability has won: the task of the
coming years is simply to work out the details, and to narrow the gap between its theory
and practice" (1996, 403). Though there are some reasons for hope (e.g. Roseland
2005; Portney 2003), the overwhelming evidence from U.S. cities suggests that a
balance between economy, society, and environment-the three pillars of
sustainability-remains elusive. Working out the details, it seems, is far from simple.
The real task for sustainability planners is to understand how a city can translate a
broad commitment like CPA into specific policy interventions to achieve meaningful,
sustainable outcomes. Where there are gaping holes between sustainability theory and
practice, significant barriers or constraints must exist.
Transportation systems pose some of the most intractable challenges to
sustainable, climate-friendly cities (Todd Goldman and Gorham 2005; Sperling 2009).
Described as the "life-blood of cities," transportation consists of a complex network of
multiple modes, often crossing jurisdictions, that aims to meet constantly fluctuating
demand. Transportation is closely linked to land use, the historical legacy of decades-
old policies and city design. Urban transportation systems involve many, often
competing, institutions in their finance, construction, operation, maintenance, and
regulation. And finally, the performance of a transportation system is affected by the
behavior of thousands of users. In short, transportation systems are influenced directly
and indirectly by closely intertwined social, spatial, economic, technical, and institutional
factors that interact in often unpredictable ways (Black 2002). It is hardly surprising,
then, that efforts to implement a clear vision for a more sustainable transportation
system typically confront multiple barriers (Banister 2005).
Nevertheless, addressing sustainability in urban transportation systems is a clear
priority. In the U.S., the transportation sector is the fastest-growing source of
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and is second only to electricity generation in its
share of GHG production (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009). The growth in
transportation emissions is driven primarily by a persistent increase in personal
automobile use, which contributed over 61 percent of transportation GHGs in 2007
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009). Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT)-the
number of miles driven by residential vehicles-grew three times faster than population
in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005 (Reid Ewing et al. 2008), and is projected to
increase another 48 percent by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy 2008). Reducing
automobile use, therefore, is essential to meeting cities' GHG-reduction targets.
But the problem with automobile dependence is not limited to GHGs. Just a few
of the environmental impacts linked to motor vehicles and the infrastructure to support
them include local air pollution (Easas and Samdahl 1998; Watson, Bates, and Kennedy
1988; Frumkin 2002; Pinderhughes 2004), groundwater contamination and excess
runoff (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1996; Litman 1999), solid waste (Freund
and Martin 1996), sprawling land use (Shoup 1997; R. Ewing 1997; R. Ewing, Pendall,
and Chen 2002), and habitat destruction (Spellerberg 1998). Furthermore, vehicle
accidents hospitalize more than 5 million people in the U.S. every year, and are the
leading cause of death for people under 35 (U.S. Center for Disease Control 2010).
Finally, cars can facilitate spatial segregation and social inequality (Henderson 2006;
Ohnmacht 2009). Clearly, achieving sustainable transportation stems will require a
transition away from the automobile dependence that characterizes urban environments
today.
Transportation patterns-which are essential to sustainability but difficult to
change-thus provide a useful focus for investigating the gap between sustainability
theory and practice. Many sustainability scholars have proffered visions for urban
transportation systems that "meet the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland and Khalid 1987;
Newman and Kenworthy 1999; Vuchic 1999; Litman 2006; Tolley 2003 ). Although the
design of such systems varies depending on the particular context, in general
sustainable transportation systems do the following: provide a balance between
multiple transport modes; support compact urban form; create vibrant, human-scale
public spaces ("livable streets"); manage transportation demand; limit automobile
parking; and price roads and car use to more closely reflect their real social costs. A
sustainable transportation system emphasizes increasing access-the ability to reach a
range of destinations-rather than maximizing mobility-the distance a person can
travel in a given period of time. Most important, a sustainable transportation system
reduces dependence on cars (Newman and Kenworthy 1999) and challenges the
system of automobility, defined as "the centering of society and everyday life around
automobiles and their spaces" (Henderson 2006, 293).
Planning processes generally address automobility by considering changes to
the physical infrastructure of transportation systems. And indeed, automobility is deeply
engrained in physical form-vast networks of streets and highways, acres of pavement
devoted to roads and parking, patterns of sprawling development. But the tremendous
dependence of society on the automobile also has structured the ways people
understand problems of transportation and mobility. Geographer Kevin Ramsey points
out that, "The car is constructed as a democratizing technology that is able to facilitate
the ultimate freedom of mobility and choice, while all other forms of mobility are
evaluated based on this standard" (Ramsey 2009). When transportation systems are
inadequate to meet demand-illustrated most plainly by chronic traffic congestion-this
conception of the car is challenged. Finding a solution depends on how the problem is
defined. As planning theorists argue, "[P]roblem constructing must always precede
problem solving" (Fischer and Forester 1993, 12). So a sustainable solution requires
rethinking the transportation problem from one of not enough mobility to one of too
many cars.
Automobility is also perpetuated, however, through the institutional framework of
transportation planning. U.S. surface transportation policy focused primarily on highway
building for nearly a century (Taylor and Schweitzer 2005). Beginning in 1991, a portion
of federal gas tax revenues were systematically earmarked for transit and other non-
roads projects for the first time. But federal funding still reflects the decades of preferred
treatment for highway building. Between 2005 and 2009, the U.S. Department of
Transportation provided an average of $10 billion in funding to transit projects,
compared to nearly $40 billion for federal highway aid programs (Baxandall, Dutzik, and
Hoen 2008). Though this is a significant improvement over transit's historical share of
federal transportation funding (see figure 1), it is still far disproportionate to the need.1
'The U.S. Department of Transportation, for example, estimates that $15.8 billion annually will be needed
for transit improvements over the next 20 years (Mallett 2007).
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Figure 1: Cumulative Government Capital Investment in Transit and Highways since 1956
Source: Baxandall, Dutzik and Hoen 2008.
While money for highways is allocated by formula, allowing each state to determine its
own priorities, funding for transit projects is awarded through a competitive grant
program, pitting projects from different regions against each other (Baxandall, Dutzik,
and Hoen 2008). Furthermore, guidelines for federal transit funding reward mobility and
cost efficiency gains over land -use and environmental benefits, and they do not take
into account the land-use changes that a project may induce-e.g. compact
development around a train station that improves the efficiency of transit operations.2
Federal transportation policy took a big leap forward in 1991, with the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which mandated that transportation investments
2 Land use and environmental benefits were only added as A in January 2009, when the Obama
Administration followed-up on a campaign promise to consider "livability" in its funding priorities. Though
transit advocates welcomed the changes, they also pointed out that the new factors have yet to be linked
to quantifiable measures.
in urbanized areas be linked to comprehensive regional plans, requiring collaboration
between local jurisdictions through metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). In most
cases, however, MPOs lack the authority to affect real reform, and most transportation
decisions revert to either cities or states (Katz, Puentes, and Bernstein 2005; Weir,
Rongerude, and Ansell 2009). Regional cooperation is further challenged by rapid
global economic restructuring, which pressures cities to compete for highly mobile
capital (Brenner 2002; Hackworth 2009). Finally, the gas tax, the primary source of both
state and federal transportation revenues, is levied on a per-gallon, not per-dollar basis;
it thus has failed to keep pace with inflation and has eroded with increasing fuel
efficiency. This has led state and local governments to turn increasingly to local ballot
measures for alternative finance mechanisms (Goldman and Wachs 2003; Surface
Transportation Policy Project 2002). Voter initiatives can reduce complex policy issues
to dichotomous choices and empower powerful interest groups at the expense of
broader public interest (Donnovan 2007; Fontaine 1988; Linde 1998). Thus, the
institutional context for transportation planning presents multiple barriers that must be
addressed in achieving a sustainable transportation system.
This thesis asks: what are the opportunities for and obstacles to devising
sustainable metropolitan transportation systems? To address this question, I investigate
the process of planning a regional transit system in Seattle, Washington, though a
review of the debate's treatment in the media, a survey of public opinion surrounding
the controversy, and personal interviews with key participants in the dispute. The case
spans the period before and after Mayor Nickels' launch of the Climate Protection
Agreement Campaign in 2005, thereby providing a window into the ways that the
emerging consensus on the climate crisis affected how struggles over automobility were
conceived, contested, and resolved.
My analysis focuses on two pairs of election campaigns for a regional transit
system; between 1995 and 2008, voters in Seattle faced sixteen separate transportation
initiatives. I focus on the four elections in which voters considered plans for a regional
transit system. This emphasis on ballot measures is not to suggest that other elements
of rapid-transit planning were less important-indeed, I explore a few core challenges in
a briefer analysis of the system's implementation. But initiative campaigns are
illuminating because they force advocates to crystallize their arguments to be
comprehensible to voters, rather than just to transportation experts. They also illustrate
the challenges and opportunities in direct democracy.3 Furthermore, looking at a series
of initiative campaigns enables me to chart how arguments for and against transit
evolved over time. In addition to analyzing the debate rhetoric, I explore the political
disputes within the regional transit agency and among the jurisdictions that have a role
in transportation decision making.
By focusing the study on a city that has led the movement to address climate
change and demonstrated a commitment to sustainability, I hope to uncover both the
possibilities for and the limitations on moving from vision to action. Seattle has political
leadership that, more than that of many peer cities, is committed to achieving a
sustainable city, and a population that, relative to the U.S. public, is supportive of
environmental policies. Therefore, the challenges Seattle encounters in implementing a
vision for a sustainable transportation system should reveal many of the fundamental
3 Though ballot measures are used increasingly in states across the country, direct democracy is
especially popular in the western U.S. California and Oregon use ballot initiatives most frequently,
followed by Colorado, North Dakota, Arizona and Washington (D. A. Smith and Tolbert 2007).
barriers to reversing automobility. Likewise, any successes can help demonstrate how
the climate-change challenge can be used to mobilize political support to achieve more
sustainable outcomes.
I argue that the creation of a light-rail system in the Seattle region was a limited
success, achieved through remarkable persistence and leadership, but constrained by a
flawed institutional structure. Funded primarily by local tax revenues, the development
of a regional-transit system in greater Seattle was plagued by intercity rivalry, forcing
political compromise at the expense of regional collaboration. Moreover, the reliance on
voter initiatives caused a balanced analysis of modal alternatives to give way to
polarized disputes. Transit opponents capitalized on the weaknesses in the
transportation-planning process, threatening the limited source of revenues for rapid
transit, and pushing for expanded highway capacity. But environmental advocates also
engaged successfully in the initiative process, using the growing salience of climate
change to reframe transportation debates. For public officials, maneuvering within the
institutional constraints required strategic and tactical decisions, and underscored the
importance of building public trust in government agencies.
The Emerald City: An Overview
Seattle was dubbed the "Emerald City" in the early 1980s, a reference to the
region's lush evergreen forests. For many residents, the city's stunning landscape
inspires a concern for the natural environment. But Seattle's topography also gives rise
to some of the area's transportation challenges; the city's major corridors are
constrained by the Puget Sound to the west, Lake Washington to the east and many
steep hills in between (figure 2). The City of Seattle's population has hovered between
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Figure 2: Seattle Metropolitan Area
Seattle is frequently heralded for its commitment to sustainability (Portney 2003;
Krueger and Agyeman 2005). Many trace the city's path to environmental leadership to
an innovative indicators project launched in 1990 by Sustainable Seattle, a volunteer-
led non-profit. The project helped form the basis for the city's comprehensive plan, what
political scientist Kent Portney describes as "[p]erhaps the single most important
element in assessing the seriousness of a city's efforts toward achieving sustainability"
500,000 and 600,000
people, rising less than 10
percent in the last 10
years. But the surrounding
suburbs have grown more
dramatically; the
population of Bellevue, for
example, a city on the
eastside of Lake
Washington, rose 26
percent between 1990 and
2000, while Everett, on the
northern edge of the
metropolitan area grew
nearly 31 percent (U.S.
Census Bureau 2000).
(2003, 36). Toward a Sustainable Seattle, adopted by the City Council in 1994, outlines
a twenty-year vision for the city, with concrete goals in areas such land use, economic
development, and transportation (City of Seattle 1994).
Evidence suggests that Seattle does more than plan for sustainability; it achieves
results. According to the city's website, Seattle was the first U.S. city to adopt LEED
green building standards for all municipal projects, a policy approved by the City Council
in 2000 (City of Seattle 201 0a). In 2006, just a year after the launch of Mayor Nickels'
Climate Protection Agreement, Seattle City Light became the first major public utility to
achieve net zero emissions.' And in December 2009, the city announced that it
achieved its CPA target, with overall emissions seven percent below 1990 levels, three
years ahead of the 2012 goal (City of Seattle 2009).
But GHG emissions are still growing from transportation, Seattle's only sector
that has not achieved reductions (City of Seattle 2009). Of the eighteen goals detailed in
the city's 2006 Climate Action Plan, eight address transportation, aiming for a combined
reduction of 370,000 tons of GHGs by 2012 (City of Seattle 2006). This deliberate focus
reflects both the scope and the severity of the transportation challenge in Seattle. As the
plan emphasizes, each year personal vehicles travel two-billion miles in Seattle, and are
the city's largest single source of GHGs (City of Seattle 2006). In 2000 there were 1.34
cars for every household in Seattle, a growth of 56 percent in ten years (City of Seattle
2005). The city's highways are widely considered to be among the country's most
congested (Downs 2004; Firestone 2001), and a senior transportation planner for the
city describes the area's bus system as "bursting at the seams" (Layzer 2010).
4 Though a dramatic claim, this was a relatively easy achievement for the city, which has relied on
hydropower as a major energy supply since the 1920s. Today, nearly 90 percent of Seattle's electricity is
hydro-generated (City of Seattle 201 Ob).
Thus for Seattle, with its roads and transit systems overburdened, its residents
concerned about environmental protection and its political leadership committed to
sustainability, a rail-transit system would seem a natural development. The story of light
rail's development, however, illustrates quite the opposite.
Case Overview
Seattle first tried to establish a rapid-transit system in the 1950s and 1960s, but
the effort faded after two failed ballot measures. The region only returned to rapid-transit
planning in 1990, as intense population growth and suburban development were
aggravating urban sprawl and traffic congestion. By 1995, a regional partnership that
spanned the three counties in the Seattle metropolitan area assembled a plan for a
metro-wide transit system, featuring light rail, commuter rail and express buses, and
advanced a ballot initiative to voters. When the measure was defeated, the regional
partnership quickly reconvened and returned to voters in 1996 with a scaled-back plan.
This time the measure succeeded, and the transit agency turned its sights to
implementation. A series of challenges nearly toppled the fledgling transit project, but
by 2005, the agency was solidly established and it began to plan for an expansion of the
transit system. The state intervened, however, forcing the transit agency to work with a
regional road-building effort. A joint roads-and-transit ballot measure was cobbled
together and presented to voters in 2007. But with fierce opposition from
environmentalists and transit opponents alike, the initiative failed badly. Again the transit
agency worked quickly to refine its own plan for system expansion, and returned to
voters with a ballot measure in 2008. Despite a deep economic recession, the initiative
was successful, winning majority support in all three counties. Light-rail service opened
the following year amidst much public acclaim.
Rapid Transit Gets Its Start
The story of Seattle's rapid-transit system begins in the 1950s, as the state was
developing plans for the region's first interstate freeway. The Seattle Transit
Commission appealed to the state to design a 50-foot median for the Central Freeway
(now Interstate 5), providing a right-of-way for a future rail line.- Though the state
denied the request, the concept of a regional mass-transit system remained and
gradually gained support.
Concerned with the inadequacy of fragmented local governments to address the
region's growing infrastructure needs, a young Seattle attorney, James Ellis, partnered
with the Seattle Municipal League to develop plans for regional government and
investment. According to Earl Clark, who described Ellis' campaign debut at the city's
Rotary Club, "Ellis warned that the area's booming growth would spawn major problems
of congestion, dislocation, and pollution, unless Seattle and its suburbs united in a great
'forward thrust' to plan for future capital improvements" (1968). In 1968, Ellis assembled
a package of twelve local bond measures including a $1.1 billion plan for a regional rail
and express-bus system, and took the proposals to King County voters (King County
1993). Early polling indicated the transit measure was likely to pass (Skidmore 1976).
But the opposition mounted a campaign claiming rapid transit would alter the region's
s The Transit Commission ran an electric trackless trolley in the city, and operated several urban bus
lines. The Commission had previously operated an elaborate network of streetcars that ceased
operations in 1941.
"way of life" (Gogerty, cited in Skidmore 1976).6 The measure won a slim majority, but
failed to garner the 60 percent it needed to pass. Undeterred, Ellis and his Forward
Thrust supporters revised the plans, and returned to voters in 1970 with a second transit
measure. In the intervening two years, however, an economic decline left voters weary
of new tax increases. This time, the measure received only 46 percent of the vote, and
the Forward Thrust organization disbanded (Skidmore 1976).'
The failure of the Forward Thrust's regional-transit campaign was a particularly
significant setback because Seattle lost $900 million in federal funding. Future transit
plans for the region would never again garner so much federal support. On the eve of
Seattle's 2007 transit ballot, Ellis lamented the 1968 defeat: "If the people had voted for
it - eventually it would have been 80 percent paid by the federal government - the
system would have been finished in 1985, at three times the size of the one before
voters this November. And the last payment for it would have been in 2008" (Veseley
2007). Without a rail-transit system to help rein-in sprawl, the region's dramatic growth
over the next three decades pushed the boundaries of the metropolitan area across
three counties. So when the region again considered rapid transit, the context for
regional cooperation was complicated by more jurisdictions and fewer federal dollars, a
recipe for intense competition.
6 Ellis noted in particular some "very clever ads" and public relations events by transit opponents including
General Motors weeks before the election (Veseley 2007).
7 The economic decline is referred to locally as the "Boeing Depression" because the City's largest
employer slashed 66,000 Seattle jobs between 1969 and 1971 (Abbott 1992).
Growth Management and the Regional Transit Authority (1990-1993)
By the early 1990s, transportation concerns in metro Seattle had reached a crisis
point in the eyes of many area residents. In one decade, population in the region had
grown 20 percent, while personal vehicle miles had jumped 80 percent (Haas et al.
2000). Vehicle ownership also had risen a dramatic 108 percent since 1970 (Joint
Regional Policy Committee 1993). To add to the region's growing pains, on
Thanksgiving weekend 1990, the 1-90 floating bridge, which carried traffic to the
burgeoning east side of Lake Washington, collapsed and sank. The images, replayed in
spectacular detail for weeks on local TV, symbolized for many the failures of Seattle's
transportation system.
Seattle-area residents increasingly expressed fears that the Northwest was
"transforming... into something akin to Southern California, with its urban sprawl, severe
traffic problems, and environmental degradation" (Woolston 1996). In several electoral
races in the Puget Sound region, growth-management advocates had beaten their
opponents largely on a platform of land-use control. Reflecting the salience of the
region's growing pains, the state legislature opened its 1990 session with mounting
political pressure for policies to curb sprawl and traffic.
State House Speaker Joe King, whose home district in Clark County had
experienced one of the most dramatic growth rates in the state, was particularly
motivated to find a solution to the state's uncurbed growth. Together with a coalition of
six House committee chairwomen, King helped to pass the Growth Management Act
(GMA) in April 1990. This landmark bill required that the state's largest and fastest
growing cities and counties complete comprehensive plans to accommodate growth in
compact urban areas. It also reflected the growing concern about the environmental
impact of unrestrained growth. According to the Act:
The legislature finds that uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together
with a lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the
conservation and the wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the environment,
sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality
of life enjoyed by residents of this state (1 990a).
Most important for the future of mass-transit planning, the GMA mandated a link
between land use and transportation, and required regional collaboration among
jurisdictions.
After passing the Growth Management Act, the legislature turned more pointedly
to transportation. With the High Capacity Transit Act (HCTA), the state established
local-option taxing authority for high-capacity transit, called for regional cooperation in
planning, and required the central Puget Sound region to complete a mass-transit
system plan. Unlike the Growth Management Act, the HCTA had no explicit
environmental purpose; instead, it purported to address the "increasing congestion on
Washington's roadways" (State of Washington 1990b). From its start, therefore, transit
was defined as a solution to a traffic problem, reflecting the centrality of the automobile
in transportation planning.
With the state mandate for mass-transit planning, within four months the Joint
Regional Policy Committee (JRPC) was formed to study transit alternatives for the
Puget Sound region. As outlined in the HCTA, the committee was created through an
interlocal agreement between King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties, and consisted of
elected officials from each county and a representative from the Department of
Transportation.
Debates over the details of the regional transit plan required by the HCTA quickly
emerged within the committee. Tensions were most pronounced between the City of
Seattle and the surrounding suburbs, with urban advocates pushing for fast but
expensive subways for efficient inner-city travel, and representatives from outside the
center city claiming that cheaper bus service would reach more dispersed areas.
Suburban officials underlined the importance of regional equity in any transportation
plan. Bellevue and Redmond, for example, both passed resolutions demanding the
rapid-transit system return economic benefits proportional to the taxes the cities'
residents would pay (Wilson 1992). As Seattle Times reporter Georgie Wilson summed
up the debate, "Equity butts up against efficiency when it comes to transit. Mass transit,
to be efficient, needs masses of people. It makes sense to put rapid transit where most
people live and work. But people on the outskirts are going to pay just as much in taxes
as those who live next to a train station" (Wilson 1992). Thus, without a successful
history of regional collaboration, a critical challenge for transit planning from the outset
was to create an institutional mechanism maintain the partnership among jurisdictions.
The JRPC responded to the regional conflicts by crafting a draft plan with a
$13.2-billion price tag that represented more of a "wish and prayer" than a hard-fought
compromise for limited transportation funds (Willams and Schaefer 1993). The draft
plan included: 105 miles of light rail with 70 stations running north and south from
Everett to Lakewood, and east and west from Seattle to Bellevue; 76 miles of commuter
rail from Everett to Seattle and south to Tacoma; expanded local and express bus and
van service; and new HOV lanes and park-and-ride lots. Though few expected such a
massive package could survive at the ballot box, the draft plan provided enough
enticement for all three counties to continue the collaboration, and in July 1993, each
voted to approve the plan and form the Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (RTA).
In the lead-up to the draft plan's approval, participants in the debate began to
coalesce around two very different definitions of the problem that the transportation
system was designed to address. These problem statements were indicative of the
conflict in values over the appropriate role for government in land use and
transportation. On the one hand, the most vocal critics of the RTA plan, led by Eastside
developer Kemper Freeman, asserted strong opposition to any rail system, calling it
"yesterday's answer to yesterday's problem" (Whitely 1992).8 In place of rail, Freeman
proposed an expansion of the region's bus service and two new highway lanes. From
his earliest statements in the press on the transit-planning process, Freeman defined
the transportation problem as one of traffic congestion, underscoring the importance of
the automobile. In response to a proposal for an extensive tri-county light-rail system,
Freeman argued, "[the Metro plan] doesn't solve the Eastside's congestion, it doesn't
solve anybody's traffic problems... My worst nightmare is to wake up and see that we
spent far more money than anybody ever thought we could scrape up and it did almost
nothing" (quoted in Higgins 1992). Freeman and other transit opponents, who came
together to form FACT-Families Against Congestion and Taxes-reiterated that the
transit plan did nothing to solve the region's traffic problems throughout the debate.
8 Opposition to rapid transit is something of a family pastime for Freeman Jr. His grandfather, Miller
Freeman was a state Legislator who challenged the railroad companies in his winning 1913 election
campaign, and then worked to weaken their influence in Olympia. He also advocated successfully for
major road projects, including the construction of the Interstate 90 Bridge connecting Seattle to the east
side of Lake Washington. Freeman Jr.'s father, Kemper Sr., pushed for the second floating bridge across
Lake Washington, and was a vocal opponent of the 1968 and 1970 Forward Thrust measures (Schaefer
and Ervin 1995).
A very distinct argument incorporated the problem of urban sprawl. "We are
addressing what the alternative of the auto will be and to a large extent where growth
will occur," explained Greg Nickels, who was then a King County councilman (quoted in
Higgins 1992). As the planning process progressed, Nickels remained the most
consistent champion of rail as the preferred mode. He describes that his support for rail
was based on the advantages for managing growth. "In Seattle, the congested corridors
and the constraints from the topography make light rail ideal. We have a strong ability to
shape land use" (Nickels 2010). Nickels' argument is notable for its explicit vision for a
city independent of the automobile. With poor grassroots support, however, his problem
definition gained little traction in the initial campaign.
The RTA draft plan did not win the immediate backing of environmental
organizations. The Sierra Club and the Washington Environmental Council, both
proponents of compact land use, targeted specific elements of the draft transit plan, in
particular the proposed park-and-ride lots at commuter rail stations. In early 1993, the
two organizations mounted a legal challenge to the plan's draft environmental impact
statement, charging the commuter parking lots would worsen the region's air pollution.
Planners downplayed the environmentalists' opposition; Dan Williams, spokesperson for
Metro (King County's transit authority) explained to the Seattle Times that the specificity
of the objections showed that "Metro has much more in common with the groups than
differences of opinion" (Higgins 1993a). But environmentalists were adamant. "Regional
Transit Plan Promotes Sprawl," proclaimed a letter to the editor by the two groups'
leaders, who argued:
When you take nothing away from the preponderance of SOVs, when you train
tens of thousands of transit riders to drive to parking lots in the middle of
wetlands, when you provide those lots with better transit services than in most
town centers, when you proliferate peak-oriented bus services and starve regular
off-peak services, then you are planning transit only for the car-dependent and
sprawl-living commuter (Higgins 1993b).
This direct challenge to the transit plan by environmentalists-the natural allies of
alternative transportation-weakened the position of the JPRC's rail supporters just as
the intense political struggle began. The committee still needed to transform the draft
plan into a viable ballot measure, an undertaking that would test the resolve of the
fledgling regional collaboration. But because of environmentalists' early concerns with
the draft plan and their focus on other pressing struggles at the time, a strong
grassroots advocacy campaign in support of the transit plan never coalesced.9 Without
an effective counterweight to FACT, and with discord among the RTA board growing,
arguments for the plan's growth-management benefits were drowned out and the
impact on traffic congestion emerged in the public debate as the primary metric for
evaluating the measure's cost effectiveness.
The RTA Ballot Measure (March 1995)
The $13.2-billion price tag of the draft transportation plan presented an easy
target for transit opponents. Even as the RTA worked to pare down the package to a
more palatable size, Kemper Freeman and his allies relentlessly highlighted the "multi-
billion dollar" cost, while emphasizing that the transit package addressed just a "little
teeny piece" of the traffic problem (Penhale 1994b). Over sixty percent of articles in the
Seattle Times and Post Intelligencer about the plan refer to traffic or congestion as the
9 Environmental groups were deeply engaged at the time in a policy debate over old-growth forests and
spotted owl protection. An organization, Citizens for Sound Transit, eventually formed to advocate for the
regional transit plan, but it never received much popular support.
primary problem for the transit system to address, reflecting the primacy of the car in
concepts of transportation and the popular appeal of Freeman's storyline.
Meanwhile, trimming the plan forced the RTA board to confront the political
quagmire of designing a regional system that was perceived as equitable to the cities
and counties in the transit district. Describing a particularly contentious RTA meeting,
Post-Intelligencer reporter Ed Penhale explained the challenge for the board: "RTA
members...often spoke in earnest about devising a rail-and-bus plan that is truly
regional. But individually, they were bound by political self-interest in bringing home a
share of the rapid transit plan that reflects the amount of tax money their constituents
would contribute to it" (1 994d). As RTA members scaled down the transit master plan
into a proposal for a more manageable first phase ballot measure, the Board's
leadership expressed cynicism that an agreement could even be achieved. "There is no
history here of regional consensus and decision making," stated RTA Director Tom
Matoff, while King County Executive Gary Locke added, "Whoever figures this out will
be an outright genius" (Penhale 1994a).
As if on cue, the squabbling between jurisdictions intensified. In response to the
first Phase I plan proposal-which would extend light rail service into Snohomish
County but stop eleven miles from the City of Everett-Mayor Ed Hansen highlighted
the disparity between projected revenues to be collected from his constituents and the
transit improvements they would enjoy. "You may assume that folks in Everett all drive
turnip trucks... but [the Chamber of Commerce and 1] would like to see Everett as part
of the regional transportation system, including light rail service to Everett" (Regional
Transit Authority 1994b). In the same meeting, Edmonds City Councilman Dave Earling
commented that the emphasis on rail left Snohomish County and eastern King County
residents waiting for "a whole lot of service for a whole long time" (Regional Transit
Authority 1994b). Meanwhile Seattle representatives insisted that a $1.3 billion subway
from Northgate to downtown was critical to moving riders through the heaviest volume
segment of the transit system (Penhale 1994a). "Everyone had a 'me-too' attitude,"
described Paul Matsuoka, Puget Sound Regional Council east corridor manager
(quoted in Rosegrant 2001).
Seattle officials framed the need for the proposed tunnel as an important
investment in the overall health of the region. In the midst of a heated debate in an
October 1994 RTA meeting, King County Councilwoman Cynthia Sullivan described, "I
am afraid if we are not very careful and caring about central cities and fostering them, it
isn't just bad for them. They are, in fact, the economic engine[s] of the entire state.
When they go down, the whole state suffers. We should build on the notion that if my
partner does well, I do well. We are all partners" (Regional Transit Authority 1994a). But
Seattle's appeal for a regional perspective was not embraced by others. As Ed Hansen
argued, "I am speaking as a representative from Everett and Snohomish County, and
we have serious traffic problems.... I know there are traffic problems in Seattle, King
County and Tacoma. I will be focusing on how this system addresses the problems in
Snohomish County" (Regional Transit Authority 1994a). Hansen later sued the RTA,
threatening to withdraw his city from the transit district if the measure was approved.
Despite calls by some RTA Board members to continue to work for consensus on
the transit plan, Chair Bruce Laing pushed for a final endorsement. On October 28,
1994, the RTA voted 15-2 to approve a $6.7-billion rail and bus plan that would be
completed within 16 years. Although significantly scaled back, the plan included 81
miles of commuter-rail service from Everett to Lakewood, and an express bus system
serving areas not reached by rail corridors. At its heart was a system of 69 miles of light
rail in three segments radiating out from Seattle-north to Lynnwood, south to Tacoma,
and east across the 1-90 bridge to Bellevue (figure 3). To finance the plan, backers
Figure 3: RTA 1995 Regional Transit System Plan. Source: soundtransit.org
asked voters in the transit district spanning all three counties to approve a sales tax
increase of 0.4 percent and a vehicle-licensing fee of 0.3 percent, which taken together
would cost the average household $8 per month. The taxes levied would cover an
estimated half the cost of the plan.
In December 1994, just three months before the election, the three counties
approved the Phase I plan, clearing the way for a March 1995 ballot. But with little time
to campaign for the package's approval, and one board member attempting to withdraw
his city completely from the RTA district, the initiative's supporters faced improbable
odds. And in the final three months, the opposition's main messages-emphasizing the
package's cost, questioning the RTA's competency, and underlining the plan's
insignificant impact on the traffic problem-grew louder.
Political divisions among the plan's backers enabled transit opponents to
advance of the notion that traffic congestion was the main problem, while using the
plan's considerable uncertainties to challenge the RTA's credibility. The fierce parochial
disputes within the RTA Board were reported in the media with painstaking detail. The
Post-Intelligencer elaborated on multiple disagreements during one RTA board meeting,
for example, as Matoff and King County Councilwoman Martha Choe presented
conflicting estimates of the travel-time improvements gained by the downtown tunnel,
and several board members proposed different formulas for calculating a county's share
of the plan's costs and benefits (Penha e 1994c). This only bolstered opponents' efforts
to erode public confidence in the RTA. Letters to the Editor in Seattle's two daily
newspapers questioned the RTA's credibility. "Metro and its successor, the Regional
Transit Authority (RTA), have a habit of understating the cost of rail transit to the
taxpayer" claimed one resident, while another outlined the perceived failures of the four-
year-old bus transit tunnel-a project of King County Metro that was fraught with
construction delays and cost overruns-as evidence of the RTA's incompetence (Burke
1994; Cain 1994). Similarly, opponents were able to tap into public outrage over an
unrelated issue-ballooning costs for overdue repairs to the Kingdome sports stadium-
which had contributed to a widespread distrust of local government. The RTA's finance
plan assumed contributions from both the state and federal government. But detractors
were quick to point out that the funding was far from secured.
To defend its credibility, the RTA assigned an independent "expert review panel"
to evaluate the plan's ridership forecasts, finance projections and cost estimates.
Weeks before the election, the panel released its results, describing the RTA's plan as
"fair and reasonable" (Schaefer 1995). Panel chair Aubrey Davis was quoted in the
Seattle Times declaring, "There is no flimflam... No one has cooked the numbers"
(Schaefer 1995). Yet following repeated attacks on the RTA's competence, Davis's
statement only reaffirmed that the agency's credibility was subject to debate.
On the eve of the election, reporter Ed Penhale summed up the choice the voters
faced, "If the RTA plan goes forward, it will be buffeted by changes in political
leadership, uncertainties about state and federal financing, and fights over what is going
to happen - or not happen - with development and rail route alignments.. .A leap of faith
will be asked of voters next week" (Penhale 1995).
Voters it seemed weren't ready for that leap, given the negative portrayal of the
RTA, the dogged emphasis on the package's price tag, and the inability of transit
backers come together and tell a compelling story about the plan's benefits. On March
14, 1995, in a special election that attracted only one-third of eligible voters, the initiative
lost badly, failing to achieve a majority in every legislative district outside of Seattle.
Though King County scraped by a 51 percent approval, Pierce County rejected the
measure with a solid 60 percent of voters opposed, and Snohomish County with a
resounding 64 percent. Much of the problem in the first election was summed up in a
Seattle Times letter to the editor describing one voter's perspective:
Public officials have a credibility problem because of the way they have
mismanaged our past investment in public assets. The proposed transit system,
projected at $6.7 billion, is 100 times greater than the Kingdome fiasco. I almost
rejected the RTA proposal because I didn't have enough information to make a
decision involving that much money. RTA proponents did not make a case that
they had done their homework... I would like to have seen some evidence that
everybody is working together on the plan. (Hartman 1995).
Without a base of popular support or any track record to demonstrate its
competence, the RTA was vulnerable to questions about its legitimacy. The charge that
the plan's financing depended on uncertain funding presented a particular dilemma;
federal funding guidelines required the demonstration of local financial support. Until a
tax increase was approved by voters, federal funding could never be guaranteed. So
the only solution was to reduce the plan's scope, so local revenues raised could support
a greater share of the costs.
The initiative's dismal results also reflected a key strategic error by the agency's
leadership. Had Laing answered calls to postpone the ballot until the following year, the
RTA may have had time to build stronger regional cohesion or at least neutralize the
opposition of public officials like Hansen. And 1996-a presidential election year-
would certainly attract stronger voter turnout. With these lessons in mind, the RTA
board reconvened to consider a revised ballot measure.
The Sound Move Ballot Measure (November 1996)
The overwhelming defeat of the RTA's plan left transit proponents with very little
time to reshape a package and build support; RTA's operating budget had money only
through June. Moreover, the authority's enabling legislation required a successful ballot
measure within two years. If the RTA failed on its second attempt to refine a proposal
and win voter approval, the regional transit-planning effort would likely dissolve.
Meanwhile, federal officials were expressing growing impatience with the region's
transportation planning efforts. At the first RTA Board meeting following the election
defeat, John Horsley, Deputy Assistant for the U.S. Department of Transportation urged
Seattle to "get its act together," and reminded the Board that other regions would be
competing for the limited New Starts funds (Regional Transit Authority 1995a).' 0
For RTA officials, these factors combined to create a tremendous sense of
urgency, which in turn caused them to focus more seriously on building public support
while strengthening regional cooperation. Unlike the previous process, the renewed
campaign for transit started with an explicit approach of listening to voters' concerns. As
RTA Vice-Chair, Tacoma City Councilor Paul Miller argued "It is incumbent to take a
pause before the Board identifies the path it needs to take... .We have an obligation to
take a step back and listen to not only what the public says, but what the proponents
and opponents have identified our role to be" (Regional Transit Authority 1995a). Two
weeks following the election, the RTA held a workshop for representatives from FACT
and Citizens for Sound Transit-the principal opponents and advocates of the 1995
New Starts is the Federal Transit Administration's major capital grant program for rail and bus rapid
transit projects.
ballot measure-to present their arguments for addressing the region's transportation
problems.
FACT members seemed to sense in RTA's "soul searching" an opportunity to
broaden the scope of the authority. In the workshop, FACT representative Hill Hornung
argued for "a drastic expansion of your charter for not only rail and buses and the full
spectrum of transit improvements, but for highway improvements as well" (Regional
Transit Authority 1995b). As FACT members envisioned it, this expanded role for RTA
would include building carpool lanes, increasing rapid bus service, and investing in
technology improvements for the region's highways, or as James Maclsaac summed
up, "capitalizing on the rubber tire system we've been building for two decades,"
(Regional Transit Authority 1995b). In short, FACT members used the momentum from
their election victory and the RTA's subsequent self-evaluation to expand the debate to
fully encompass the auto-centric transportation agenda.
This broader focus was also reflected in the problem definition FACT members
advanced during the workshop. In marked contrast to their disciplined reiteration of the
"traffic problem" during the previous campaign, FACT members at the workshop
focused on the "suburban mobility crisis" as the "mass majority problem" of the
transportation system (Regional Transit Authority 1995b). In a particularly candid
moment, Hornung described the previous campaign's use of congestion as the primary
problem definition: "The swing issue was congestion. As people discovered your plan
would not reduce congestion, they flipped. That is why our campaign was very
consistent in focusing on congestion" (Regional Transit Authority 1995b). But
emboldened by their success, FACT approached the renewed transit campaign
articulating the more explicit value choice of freedom of mobility facilitated by the
automobile.
Though the tone of FACT's presentations in the March workshop was largely
conciliatory, not far below the surface was a direct threat to rail proponents. Horning
warned that if the Board were to push for "the maximum rail profile you can get past the
ballot in the spring, the region will have gone into a state of suspended animation. You
will gear up and we will gear up and the region will decide once again whether rail lives
or dies. What we have proposed is that if that is the course the RTA is proceeding
down, we oppose it" (Regional Transit Authority 1995b).
Unlike FACT's members, representatives of Citizens for Sound Transit gave little
attention to either the specific elements or the broader purpose of the transit plan, but
focused instead on the need for a good process to build regional consensus. Only
Preston Schiller of the Sierra Club spoke to the substance of a new RTA plan, arguing
emphatically, "Highway expansion increases congestion. That has been proven by
research.... HOV is a non-solution for various reasons, including the fact that it is a form
of highway expansion. EPA analysis and models have analyzed the effects of HOV
lanes and conclude it increases driving and does not improve air quality" (Regional
Transit Authority 1995b). But overall, CST's message to RTA was to "get out to listen to
what the public will support" (Regional Transit Authority 1995b). CST's comments
reflected the sense of an untapped potential for grassroots RTA support. One transit
supporter questioned the RTA board about its lack of a base-building campaign: "I was
in some panic a week before the election to find that even though I am a grassroots
person, no one had contacted me to work on this campaign. I made a few random calls
and found that no one else had been contacted either. The people running the RTA
campaign did not utilize a grassroots component. I think that was a grievous error"
(Regional Transit Authority 1995a).
The RTA seemed to take CST's advice to heart. Over the next several months,
the agency held over 400 public meetings and workshops with residents across the
transit district. Meanwhile FACT worked quickly to build support for an RTA mission
inclusive of highway expansion. In March and April 1995, members testified before the
King County Council and the state's house and senate transportation committees,
arguing the need for increasing road capacity. Their efforts met with early success when
the legislature earmarked $750,000 for private groups to study alternatives to the RTA's
preferred transit alternatives. Though the provision was later vetoed by Governor Mike
Lowry, FACT's lobbying helped build support for the inclusion of some roads element
into any new RTA measure.
In addition, the legislature approved the allocation of $2.5 million to RTA-far
less than the $9 million the Board had requested, but enough to continue work toward a
second ballot measure. With funding secured, the RTA Board turned its attention to
building regional cooperation and public support. As Board Chair Bruce Laing
described, "While some Board members may be feeling frustration because the Board is
not actively engaged in developing a revised proposal at this time, the primary focus of
the Board is on reaching a consensus" (Regional Transit Authority 1995c). To achieve
this objective, the RTA hired a mediator and launched a process to establish shared
regional priorities. In addition, the Board identified the need to integrate its revised plan
more closely with the Metropolitan Transportation Plan created by the Puget Sound
Regional Council (PSRC), the area's federally mandated metropolitan planning
organization, which led the region's growth-management efforts. RTA's new approach
thus seemed to better incorporate the institutional prerequisites to sustainable
transportation planning: regional cooperation, multi-modal coordination, and integration
with compact land-use strategies.
But tensions were brewing beneath the surface. The board struck one
controversial compromise with the adoption of "subarea equity," dividing the transit
district into five areas. Each sub-area would maintain control of its share of tax
revenues, though decisions would still be subject to Board approval. If a sub-area fell
short of revenue, it could not use funds from another sub-area without the two-thirds
support of the Board. The finance scheme was designed to win support from suburban
members, who feared Seattle's expensive tunneling would consume more than its share
of revenues. But critics charged the regional equity plan was "parochial politics at its
worst." As Nickels described, "It is a very regressive policy...The East King County area
has a very healthy tax base, people are buying BMWs all the time, so they have lots of
motor vehicle tax money. But you can't use that financial strength for any other place
but East King County" (quoted in Rosegrant 2001, 12).
The subarea equity agreement illustrates the constraints of the institutional
framework for transportation planning. Few cities were willing to think beyond their own
self-interest to preserve the integrity of the system as a whole. Tacoma, for example,
planned its own 1.5-mile light-rail line connecting the city's downtown with the Tacoma
Dome. Though the service has proven popular with Tacoma residents, the money used
to build the short segment arguably could have been better utilized to improve the
transit plan for the region as a whole. Nonetheless, without the promise of additional
federal support, the subarea equity agreement may have been a necessary
compromise to prevent the in-fighting over limited tax revenues that weakened the 1995
measure.
As work toward a revised plan progressed, the roads-versus-rail debate
foreshadowed at the March 31 workshop grew louder, and threatened to break apart the
regional collaboration. In March 1996, the Board released its revised draft plan, titled
"Sound Move," featuring a regional express bus system, peak-hour commuter rail from
Everett to Lakewood, 100 miles of HOV lanes, and 21 miles of light rail, with an
integrated fare system for "seamless transition" between modes. The most notable
changes from the previous year's plan were the dramatic decrease in the light-rail
system-which aside from the short segment in Tacoma, would be built entirely within
King County-and the new inclusion of HOV lanes. The region's key environmental
organizations, including the Sierra Club, the Washington Environmental Council, and
1,000 Friends of Washington, immediately blasted the plan, declaring it the result of
"efforts to buy support of powerful special interest groups ... rather than a strategic
effort to resolve the region's transportation problems as efficiently as possible" (Foster
1996a). Particularly offensive to environmentalists was the major HOV expansion and a
$10 million provision to study the expansion of the Rt-520 floating bridge. Predictably,
Kemper Freeman and other transit opponents also dismissed the Sound Move plan,
calling it "politics at its worst," and charging once again that the rail projects would
"make no discernible impact on the worsening congestion problem" (Foster 1996a;
Foster 1996b).
With criticism from all sides, members of the Regional Outreach Committee, the
RTA board's consensus-building group, urged the RTA to delay the election by a year.
But others were adamant that the measure should move forward on schedule. "It's 1996
or nothing," declared Martha Choe, Seattle city councilor and RTA board member
(Schaefer 1996). Greg Nickels recalls his strong support for a 1996 ballot: "A
presidential election is where you want to be for a transit issue. Younger voters vote in
presidential elections and younger voters are the most avid advocates of transit. They
believe they will live to see the results of an investment like light rail and they want it
and they're willing to pay for it" (Nickels 2010). So when the committee voted eight to
five to advance the initiative-far from a consensus decision-the board chair decided
to accept the vote as an endorsement and push for the approval of the RTA board.
Members authorized the Sound Move plan for a November 5th election. Given that the
1995 measure was undermined by conflict within the RTA board, the decision to send
the Sound Move plan to the ballot with only slim majority of support was a bold move.
But it proved to be a pivotal decision.
Political officials scrambled to rebuild support for Sound Move. In May 1996,
Governor Lowry hosted a meeting with ten environmental organizations as well as RTA
Executive Director Bob White and Chair Bob Drewel. In a deft political move, White
proposed that the state should assume responsibility for the HOV-Iane expansion, while
the RTA would handle only the access ramps once the new lanes were built. In this way
the RTA could maintain the concept of high-occupancy travel lanes as part of the Sound
Move package-an element critical to support from Eastside jurisdictions-but could
reassure environmentalists that the tax measure would not directly support highway
expansion. To further placate environmentalists, White expressed the board's
willingness to drop the controversial 520 bridge study from the ballot package.
The proposed changes were enough to win the endorsement of the
environmentalists. As the election approached, they continued to emphasize the
environmental problems associated with cars, arguing that the RTA plan was an
alternative to sitting in traffic. Aaron Ostrom of Alt-trans, a new statewide transit
advocacy organization, argued in a column in the Post-Intelligencer, "Cars are our
largest source of air pollution. They are major contributors to urban sprawl, water
pollution, oil spills and global warming. Auto accidents kill around 40,000 people in the
United States every year and seriously injure 500,000 more." And he went on to
highlight the advantages of rail transit. "Rail investments...offer the transportation
infrastructure required to make growth management work-a system that can serve the
concentrated urban centers called for in regional growth management plans" (Ostrom
1995)
Meanwhile, in an indication of the increasing polarization in the debate on the
ballot initiative, transit opponents criticized the effectiveness of rail, and extolled the
advantages of the automobile. As one article described, "People get a tremendous
benefit from cars... Most people view cars as a superior good because of door-to-door
flexibility" (Foster 1996d). Another accused the RTA plan of being a "social engineering"
scheme "to woo families away from suburban, single-family homes and get them into
trains and high-rise apartments" (Foster 1996c). Thus when voters went to the polls on
November 5th, the debate had been distilled in the press as a choice between the car
and the train as the mode choice for the region's future. And multiple polls had
indicated a consistent preference for rail among Seattle-area voters (Rosegrant 2001).
The Sound Move ballot measure won resoundingly with an overall 58-42 margin,
achieving majority support in all three counties. Voters also approved a 0.4 percent
increase in the local sales tax and a 0.3 percent increase in the motor-vehicle tax for a
$3.9 billion transit and HOV ramp package that would be completed in an estimated ten
years (figure 4).
At the RTA meeting three days later, board members were triumphant. The RTA
leadership "slam-dunked" the campaign, proclaimed King County Councilmember
Cynthia Sullivan, while Vice Chair Paul Miller of Tacoma observed, "This is the first truly
regional effort that will have concrete results" (Regional Transit Authority 1996). Pierce
County Executive Doug Sutherland elaborated on the significance of the regional
planning effort:
The term "we" is very inclusive. I remember trying to convince each other of what
different aspects of the plan should look like. I remember listening to the public
and trying to figure out what we were trying to accomplish... I have watched all of
you work to convince the opponents, pundits and the public and convince
yourselves that this was a doable activity. All of us, at some time, will be zipping
along on some conveyance not currently available, saying, "I remember when...."
We will recognize how important some of our activities truly were. (Regional
Transit Authority 1996).
Considering the skepticism expressed by the RTA's leadership in 1994 that regional
collaboration could even be achieved, the success of Sound Move was indeed an
important accomplishment. The 1996 campaign was marked by far fewer disputes
between jurisdictions within the transit district than that of the year before. Everett
Mayor Ed Hansen in particular was appeased by the subarea equity agreement, and
campaigned enthusiastically in favor of Sound Move. And in turn, Snohomish county
voters showed the most dramatic turnaround in their support for the measure, approving
Sound Move by a by a margin of 55 percent (it was turned down by 64 percent the year
before). The leadership of local public officials, therefore, seems an important factor
influencing the voters' willingness to support a transit measure.
Figure 4: Sound Move System Plan. Source: soundtransit.org
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Implementation Challenges (1997-2005)
Although triumphant about the passage of Sound Move, the board and staff of
the RTA were also mindful of the significant task that lay ahead. Executive Director Bob
White described the need to break the $3.9 billion project into manageable pieces: "The
first step is to recognize this is not one project but it is literally hundreds of projects"
(Regional Transit Authority 1996). Joni Earl, who would become executive director
following White's resignation, recalls the challenge facing RTA in 1996: "We were the
first transit agency in the country that tried to go from zero to a hundred. We had no
framework, we had no institutional structure... .you've just promised the voters to deliver
a $4 billion dollar project in 10 years, of which every siting decision still had to be
made....it was hugely complex" (Earl 2010). Over the next decade, a series of
challenges-especially in building the organization, planning the detailed light-rail route,
and responding to citizen ballot initiatives-tested the strength of the regional
collaboration and demonstrated that the election was only an initial victory. As Miller
reminded his colleagues on the board, "The work is just now beginning" (Regional
Transit Authority 1996).
Organization Buildinq
The first task for the RTA (dubbed "Sound Transit" shortly after the election) was
to build an organization. The RTA had run the two elections largely with borrowed staff
from the counties' planning agencies (Rosegrant 2001). Joni Earl recalls that following
the 1996 election, the entire institution of Sound Transit was composed of 23
employees, mostly planners. "Planners are wonderful, and we need them all. But to also
figure out how to run a business was very challenging" (Earl 2010). Executive Director
White faced the job of creating basic systems like how to pay people, and how to write a
contract, while sticking to the "very aggressive schedule" for rolling out the new transit
service (Earl 2010).
With 21 miles of new light rail corridors, 20 regional bus routes, and 81 miles of
heavy rail commuter service, the process for detailed route planning, siting decisions,
finance planning, and property acquisitions was a tremendous undertaking. White
described to the board the need for balance, with progress toward all modes in the
system and in every sub-area in the region. He also emphasized the importance of
showing early results, to build trust with the public and to remain competitive for federal
funding (Regional Transit Authority 1996). By mid-1 997, Sound Transit adopted a
capital plan which stipulated a timeline for the agency's investment projects, and in
September, Sound Transit launched its first new bus service-an express route
between Tacoma and Seattle-and broke ground on a park-and-ride lot in Lynnwood.
So optimism was running high in 1998 when Sound Transit selected thel 8 "most
promising route alternatives" for light rail, kicking-off an intense period of detailed study
and public engagement in neighborhoods across the transit district.
Unlike the commuter rail, which would utilize existing tracks, the light-rail system
required establishing a new right-of-way, and therefore entailed the most complicated
planning of the Sound Move package. The light rail would span 21 miles and consist of
three segments: the 15.6 mile Central Link between SeaTac Airport and downtown
Seattle; the 3.1 mile University Link, extending from downtown Seattle to the University
of Washington; and the 1.6 mile Tacoma Link, connecting downtown Tacoma with the
city's commuter rail station.
Site and right-of-way planning is notoriously contentious, as multiple interests
compete over the future form and function of the city (Weitz 2008). And parties that feel
excluded from a siting decision process may be more likely to become opponents of a
new facility (Smith and Marquez 2000). As Sound Transit developed its preferred
alignment for its "starter" light rail system, debates were particularly intense in the cities
of Tukwila, Federal Way and Seatac, and in several Seattle neighborhoods, including
the University District and First Hill. But in Seattle's Rainier Valley, the decision over the
light-rail alignment was arguably the most contentious.
Residents of the Rainier Valley, a racially diverse, working-class neighborhood,
reacted angrily to plans for a 4.6-mile segment down the center of one of the area's
busiest streets, charging Sound Transit with racial and economic discrimination."
Neighborhood activists contrasted the agency's plans for expensive tunnels through the
wealthier downtown districts with the street-grade design for the Rainier Valley. Area
residents claimed the rail line would bisect the neighborhood, disrupt traffic and
pedestrian activity, and devastate local businesses. "They are saving money on the
south end, like usual," remarked one long-time resident (Foster 1998b). Sound Transit
board members, however, maintained that the alignment decision was based on
topography and land use. The hilly terrain and denser development of downtown Seattle
made a tunnel necessary; in contrast, MLK Way was flat and wide, at 108-feet wide,
providing ample room for a rail and requiring relatively few property acquisitions.
" According to the 2000 Census, 41.6% of the neighborhood's population is Asian, 22.3% is Black or
African-American, and 24.4% is White. Thirty-eight percent of the Rainier Valley's population is foreign
born, and median household income is $42,993, well below the $65,800 median household income of the
Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Area (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
The decision to build at-grade through the Rainier Valley was clearly a sound
decision for the transit district as a whole; with limited funding, any tunneling not
necessary for topography or land-use constrictions would require cutting-back service in
another part of the plan. And the precedent of putting rail underground would surely
complicate negotiations with other neighborhoods in the district. Sound Transit's
approach to the challenging politics in the Rainier Valley, however, worsened its
relationship with the most vocal critics. Greg Nickels recalls that the initial designs for
the light-rail route south of downtown would have bypassed the Rainier Valley all
together. So public officials in Seattle challenged the plans, maintaining "We've got to
take it through the Rainier Valley so we actually serve people" (Nickels 2010). There is
little evidence that the board reached out to neighborhood activists to engage them in
this early decision, however. Once the process for the stations and route planning
began, Rainier Valley residents were vocal in expressing their concerns about the MLK
Way alignment as well as their suspicions that the neighborhood would be treated
unfairly. At a community workshop held by Sound Transit, neighborhood activist
Suzanne Scommodau told agency staff, "This is the most diverse population in the
county, and we don't want something shoved down our throats" (Foster 1998a). But
weeks later, the 18 different routes selected for study for the light-rail system did not
include a tunnel alternative through the Rainier Valley. For the local activists, this
suggested that Sound Transit considered their concerns irrelevant. Residents eventually
sued Sound Transit on civil rights and environmental justice grounds. Though the legal
challenge failed in federal appellate court, it stalled progress on contract negotiations
and property acquisitions for a critical link of the transit line.
After its initial missteps, Sound Transit was more proactive in building trust with
local communities. The Sound Transit board created a $50 million economic
development fund to be used to help Rainier Valley businesses forced to relocate or
negatively impacted by construction. The fund helped assuage some concerns,
particularly when the community was given significant authority over its management
and dispersal. As the construction project broke ground, Sound Transit staff were on-
hand in the affected neighborhoods, communicating frequently with businesses and
residents to trouble-shoot any problems that they could. And the investment in
relationship-building seems to have paid off. As Mike Peringer, executive director of the
Sodo Business Association described, "They've been probably one of the most
cooperative public agencies around as far as our community is concerned... .When we
did have a few problems when they were putting in those casings, they immediately
addressed the problems and solved it" (Hadley 2004).
Challenges from the ballot box.
Beyond the planning and public-relations challenges of building a new transit
system, Sound Transit had to contend with several threats posed by voter initiatives.
Though the Agency owed its existence to direct democracy, Seattle's notorious populist
streak presented two significant sets of challenges for the fledgling transit agency during
its first decade. The first, a grassroots effort to create a citywide monorail system,
threatened to complicate the light-rail route planning, erode trust in public transit, and
generate competition for future tax revenues. The second, a series of statewide anti-tax
initiatives proposed to cut-off one of Sound Transit's primary sources of revenue.
Shortly before the Sound Move election, a local activist proposed to take the
city's worsening traffic congestion into his own hands. Dick Falkenbury, a cab driver and
city tour guide drafted Initiative 41 which called for the city to establish the Elevated
Transportation Company (ETC) to raise private financing for a citywide monorail. The
measure designated a 40-mile X-shaped transit system to link the city's four corners
with its downtown core, but it did not include a public price tag or levy a tax.
To the astonishment of the city's political leaders, who had largely dismissed the
measure as irrelevant, Initiative 41 won with a 53 percent majority. After considerable
debate, Mayor Paul Schell and the city council created a 12-member ETC board, and
allocated $200,000 to fund its first year of operations.
Though voters had been told the monorail showed great promise for attracting
private investment, financing the project proved elusive. In 2000, with City Council
threatening to repeal the monorail initiative, the ETC returned to voters, winning
approval for $200 million in municipal borrowing capacity. Two years later, the monorail
was back on the ballot for a third time with Initiative 1, which won a razor-thin majority in
support of a 1.4 percent car-tax increase that would help pay for the estimated $1.75
billion transit plan.
For Sound Transit, the monorail introduced a new complication to its light-rail
routing and site planning. Sound Move had promised voters "seamless integration" of
the region's transit networks, and the 1996 plan was the result of years of bargaining
and coordination among the four transit agencies, 51 cities, and three counties in the
transit district. The entrance of the monorail reopened several hard-fought agreements;
several miles of the proposed elevated route would parallel the city's light-rail line, which
for some represented an absurd redundancy in a transit-starved region. Dueling opinion
pieces in the press called simultaneously for Sound Transit to abandon part of its light-
rail system (Johnson 1999), and for the monorail money to be used to improve the light-
rail system (Himma 1999). But the monorail's potential impact on public opinion was
perhaps a greater threat to Sound Transit than the added complexity of service
integration. With Initiative 1, the monorail became a public transit agency. Any misstep
would reflect poorly on the ability of publicly run entities to deliver transportation
services. In describing feedback from voters on transportation issues, State House
Transportation Chair Judy Clibborn observes, "Most people don't recognize that Sound
Transit is its own entity" (Clibborn 2010). So as the Monorail project fell into deeper
financial troubles, Sound Transit officials worried that the beleaguered regional transit
system would suffer the repercussions.
Shortly after the Monorail began collecting its first tax revenues, it was apparent
that the vehicle excise tax had been significantly overestimated. The monorail
scrambled to scale-back the plan and shore-up private financing. But ongoing
negotiations with the project's only private bidder were going poorly, and the project's
costs ballooned-reaching at one point an estimated $11 billion. In November 2005 yet
another monorail initiative-the fifth since 1997-was put on the ballot. 2 Voters
rejected the measure by a margin of 64.5 percent to 35.5 percent, derailing the eight-
year monorail effort. The agency was $110 million in debt, and Seattle car owners
would continue to pay vehicle taxes through June 2006 for a transit system they knew
would never be built.
12 A fourth initiative in 2004, the "Monorail Recall" was soundly defeated by voters.
Most accounts of the monorail attribute its failure to poor financial management
and overly optimistic cost estimates. Regardless of the accuracy of these critiques, the
popular perception that the Monorail mismanaged public funds helped fuel a series of
anti-tax measures that posed an even greater threat to Sound Transit.
The tax measures were spearheaded by Tim Eyman, a self-taught activist with a
passion for small government and a penchant for ballot initiatives.13 Eyman's general
interest seemed to be to minimize government; in a documentary charting his impact on
Washington politics, Eyman proclaims "Olympia is gorging itself. Priorities of
government was replaced with pig-out on government" (Fraser 2006). But many of his
efforts were directed more pointedly at transportation. In 1999, Eyman sponsored the
successful Initiative 695, which cut the statewide motor vehicle excise tax to a flat $30.14
In 2000, Initiative 745 proposed to earmark 90 percent of state and local transportation
spending for road construction and maintenance. The State's Office of Financial
Management estimated the initiative could shift as much as $2 billion from transit
spending every two years (Garber 2000). With a coordinated campaign involving transit
and environmental activists, city and county officials, and many of the state's biggest
employers, the measure was defeated.
Eyman, however, was undeterred, and in 2001 he launched Initiative 776, a
measure to eliminate local motor-vehicle excise taxes (MVET). Though the measure
appeared on the ballot in all 39 of the state's counties, its provisions applied only to four,
' Between 1998 and 2009, Eyman spearheaded seventeen separate ballot measures which achieved
enough signatures to go before voters. The initiatives ranged from prohibiting affirmative action to cutting
property taxes to earmarking transportation spending for road building. Voters passed eight of Eyman's
initiatives, though several were subsequently declared unconstitutional.
14 Initiative 695 was subsequently declared unconstitutional, but Governor Locke, fearing a backlash from
the anti-tax proponents, rolled the state's car tax back to $30.
including the three counties in the Sound Transit district that had implemented a local-
vehicle tax. Eyman was explicit in targeting the transit agency in his campaigning.
"Sound Transit has been sucking money down the drain," he charged at a debate on the
measure (Godden 2002). The motor vehicle tax accounted for approximately 20 percent
of the agency's budget, and though the MVET repeal wouldn't on its own eliminate the
agency, pundits and activists agreed the measure was "a weapon to stop light rail"
(Ramsey 2002).' On November 5, 2002 Initiative 776 won a 51 percent majority
statewide. Voters within the Sound Transit district rejected the measure, a fact which
the agency quickly cited as a vote of confidence for the regional transit system. But the
majority approval statewide raised the possibility of a major budget shortfall for Sound
Transit, just as the agency was emerging from its most challenging crisis since the 1996
election.
The Dark Days
Joni Earl, Sound Transit CEO, describes the period from 2000 to 2001 as the
agency's "dark days," when Sound Transit was on the brink of collapse (Gutierrez
2009). She attributes the troubles to the lack of organizational infrastructure within
Sound Transit after the 1996 election. "It was just bigger than what the agency in its
startup mode was really able to really do... It was an agency in over its head" (Earl
2010). According to Earl, in its early years, Sound Transit lacked good systems for cost
is Environmental organizations including 1000 Friends of Washington, the Sierra Club, and the
Transportation Choices Coalition were a part of the opposition campaign. But environmental groups
seemed to prioritize another statewide ballot measure-Referendum 51, sponsored by the State
Legislature, which proposed to increase the state's gas and sales tax for a $7.7 billion package for roads
spending. Each of the organizations' websites in the month before the election featured the No on 51
Campaign prominently, whereas support for the 1776 opposition was less apparent. Moreover, press
coverage of R51 frequently cited the referendum's potential impact on pollution and global warming, while
only one article on 1776 raised environmental concerns.
estimates and budget tracking. Under pressure to meet the ten-year timeline promised
to voters, staff made commitments to communities, increasing the scope of the project
without compensating for the increased costs. "They weren't tracking all the
yeses...They literally didn't know what they didn't know" (Earl 2010).
A few weeks before Earl joined the staff, rumors began circulating that the
design-build process for the first light-rail segment was in trouble. Perhaps to save time
or money, the agency had short-listed only two bidders to submit a full proposal-less
than the range of three to five considered ideal by industry standards (Palaneeswaran
and Kumaraswamy 2000). The agency selected Modern Transit Constructors, a
decision immediately maligned because of the contractor's role in Boston's Big Dig
fiasco. So when reports emerged that Modern Transit's bid was $350 million over the
agency's budget estimates, rail opponents sprang to life, declaring that the light-rail
project was "tapped out," and claiming the burgeoning rail costs could lead to "siphoning
money from the bus system" (McGann 2000a; Lewis 2000). A group of more than 50
elected officials and civic leaders, including King County councilmembers Rob McKenna
and Maggi Fimia and former governor Booth Gardner-all long-time rail opponents-
demanded that Sound Transit disclose the details of the contract bidding, and called for
an independent audit of the agency's light-rail project. But Sound Transit flatly refused
to open its books, claiming another study would "kill the project." "No more delays. No
more process. No more magic bullets.. .Just build it!" bellowed board member Ron Sims
(McGann 2000b). Executive Director White expressed confidence in the contract
negotiations, maintaining that contractors bid high to leave themselves room to
negotiate. Meanwhile the agency released a report claiming the initial light-rail line from
downtown to the University District could be completed with savings as high as $255
million.
Pressure on the regional transit agency, however, continued to rise. One attack
in the press by rail opponent Richard Morrill criticized the growth-management
objectives of the transit plan, calling the light-rail planning process "faddish, elitish, and
unfair to many," and condemning commuter-rail service as "an inconsequential toy"
(Morrill 2000). McKenna and Fimia led a King County public forum to address concerns
about light rail's escalating costs, with a panel of seven elected officials critical of light
rail and a national expert on transit tunnels. The forum concluded with a renewed call
for Sound Transit to release its detailed cost estimates.
Surrendering to the pressure, Sound Transit's board abruptly announced it would
launch an independent review of the light-rail tunnel. Seattle Mayor and Sound Transit
board member Paul Schell explained the agency's about-face: "There has been an
erosion of public confidence in Sound Transit... .What we're beginning is a process to
restore that confidence" (Lange 2000). Three days earlier, Joni Earl had joined the staff
as chief operating officer, and was asked to conduct a comprehensive internal review of
the struggling light-rail project.
The agency had more to rebuild than confidence, however, after failing to heed
warning signals that its light-rail project was off track and staunchly denying any
troubles. Earl's review revealed the depths of Sound Transit's problems; the light-rail
system was $1.1 billion over budget-three times the rumored tunnel overruns-and
three years behind schedule. Earl turned quickly to creating new internal systems "to
monitor, manage and control the budget, cost and schedule goals for the project"
(Sound Transit 2001). She also reorganized the agency's external-relations staff to
manage the "constant challenge to have consistent, timely, and proactive
communication with so many stakeholders simultaneously" (Sound Transit 2001). Earl
recalls telling the Sound Transit staff, "The only way we're going to get our credibility
back is just to do the work. I can go out there and say we're better, we've improved, but
it's not going to mean squat until we deliver stuff" (Earl 2010). Earl's strong leadership
illustrated by her efforts to build regular and transparent communications, and her
commitment to ensuring accountability, was instrumental in salvaging the agency from
its near collapse.
Earl's focus on rebuilding the organization also seemed to bolster the board,
which despite calls to abandon light rail, voted in January 2001 to expand the budget
and timeline for the controversial project. The vote came just in time to secure a $500
million full-funding grant agreement with the federal government before President Bill
Clinton-considered more supportive of transit than his successor-left office.16
The board's commitment to continue light rail, however, did not quell the criticism
from outside skeptics. The revelation of the agency's severe financial and organizational
troubles gave fuel to a series of political attacks aimed at destroying Sound Transit.
Opponents lobbied representatives in the state house to revoke the agency's
authorizing legislation, and urged federal lawmakers to deny the agency funding. Rail
foes on the King County Council worked to block the transfer of the downtown transit
tunnel to Sound Transit (an agreement brokered just months earlier, and necessary to
16 Three months later, the agency's federal funding was suspended until the U.S. Inspector General could
complete an audit of Sound Transit's light-rail project, a process which would take two years.
proceed with plans to retrofit the tunnel for light rail). And a flurry of radio ads called on
citizens to demand another vote on the regional transit agency.
Earl recalls that the press coverage during that period was "absolutely
unrelenting" (Earl 2010). Reporting on the January board meeting, Tacoma News
Tribune journalist David Quigg described the "long parade of public speakers" opposing
light rail. His story quoted several critics, including rail foe Emory Bundy, who attacked
the decision to expand the light-rail budget and timeline, "You claim that voters gave
you a blank check and an open schedule" (Quigg 2001). Shortly after that meeting,
Executive Director Bob White announced his resignation, explaining that new leadership
"unencumbered by past issues and decisions" could better restore public faith in the
transit agency. The Post Intelligencer story on his decision highlighted the disparaging
comments from board member McKenna, who called White's resignation a
"smokescreen." "You can't put lipstick on a sow. And this project is a pig ....and we
haven't even started building it yet" (McGann 2001 a). In May 2001, Post Intelligencer
reporter Chris McGann released a story asserting that Sound Transit had deliberately
concealed light-rail's true costs from both voters and bond investors (McGann 2001 b).
But six days later, after Earl and her staff produced volumes of evidence contradicting
the article's claims, the paper was forced to retract the story.
The Post Intelligencer's admission of its shoddy reporting was an indication that
the agency had turned a corner in managing its public relations, and marked the
beginning of a slow, but steady restoration of Sound Transit's credibility. Through
tireless dialogue with state and federal politicians, Earl slowly shored up the light-rail
project's political support. To fend off another budget shortfall, agency lawyers
challenged the Eyman initiative's cut to Sound Transit car-tax revenues. 7 Meanwhile,
with solid management systems, the agency began meeting important milestones, and
celebrating the achievements in the press. In August 2003, Tacoma Link-the first light
rail segment of the plan-began service between the Tacoma Dome and the city's
downtown, and quickly exceeded ridership expectations by more than 50 percent. Two
months later, the Federal Transit Administration signed the $500 million full funding
grant agreement for the Central Link light rail system.'8 And in December 2003,
Sounder commuter rail service opened in Everett, completing the rail line promised to
voters in 1996. Attention to the agency's community relationships also seemed to be
paying off. When the Rainier Valley's $50 million economic development fund was
launched, the project was praised for its degree of community oversight and its promise
to strengthen the neighborhood. As the fund's board chair Nemesio Domingo
expressed, "[T]his community is going to have what it's never had before and that's
money... It means self-determination" (Hadley 2003a). With mounting evidence that the
"dark days" were in the agency's past, the board turned again to long-range visioning,
launching a process for a second-phase ballot measure to expand the regional-transit
system.
17 The appeal was a partial success. The state's Supreme Court decided that because the revenues were
already pledged to repay bonds issued to fund the Sound Move plan, the agency could continue to collect
the car tax. Sound Transit could not use the car tab for future projects, however.
18 After receiving a clean Inspector General's audit, Sound Transit got top ratings in the federal grant
process. But funding was nearly denied again when Congresswoman Dunn, a Republican representative
from the Eastside, tried to kill the agency's application, citing concerns that the Seattle light-rail project
would raid funds from the Eastside's revenue pool. Congressman Dunn, Democrat from Tacoma and
strong Sound Transit supporter described the particularly partisan politics, "I've been in Congress a long
time, and I've never seen the delegation, frankly, go at each other as it did on this particular project,"
(Hadley and Pope 2003). The FTA grant agreement stipulated that the Board sign a commitment "not to
siphon away money from the Eastside or other areas for the light rail project" (Hadley and Pope 2003).
Sound Transit II
That process began with an update of the Regional Transportation Long-Range
Vision. Building from the original vision statement adopted in 1993, the board
demonstrated a clear focus when it unanimously adopted the following goals:
- Provide a public transportation system that helps ensure long-term mobility,
connectivity, and convenience for the citizens of the Puget Sound region for
generations to come
- Preserve communities and open space
- Contribute to the region's economic vitality
- Preserve our environment
- Strengthen communities' use of the regional transit network
(Sound Transit and Brinckerhoff 2007, 16).
Especially notable given the history of opposition from the Eastside was the
support from Bellevue Mayor Connie Marshall, a new member of Sound Transit's
Finance Committee. Journalist Jane Hadley described Marshall's enthusiasm:
"Bellevue loves the projects Sound Transit has built so far and wants to start on more"
(Hadley 2003b). The five sub-areas devised during Sound Move planning were
preserved, and seemed to be a critical, if imperfect, mechanism to continue regional
cooperation. Within a year, Sound Transit released a supplemental environmental
impact statement for a revised long-range plan, and the board began devising a
strategy for a Phase 11 ballot measure in 2006.
Highway proponents, however, saw an opportunity in the preparations for a new
transit ballot measure. The state's roads and bridges by all accounts had deteriorated to
the point where a crisis was imminent. Some 40 bridges were critically in need of
repairs, and plans to address urgent safety concerns on regional highways, including
the Alaskan Way Viaduct and the 520 Floating Bridge, were mired in debate. Meanwhile
worsening traffic congestion fueled appeals for new road capacity to relieve the area's
worst bottlenecks. The need for highway investments, however, far outstripped the
revenues available from the state. Revenues for Washington's highways came primarily
from the state's gas tax, which had not kept pace with inflation. Moreover the Eyman
car-tab initiative had slashed funding for many state transportation projects.
To begin to address the shortfall, the legislature had created the Regional
Transportation Investment District (RTID) in 2002, authorizing King, Pierce and
Snohomish Counties to collaborate in raising money for regional transportation projects.
The authorizing legislation prioritized the addition of "lane capacity" to "highways of
statewide significance" as well as the replacement of earthquake-damaged structures
(like the Alaskan Way Viaduct). The RTID created a draft plan listing priority roads
projects in the three counties. But polling suggested that the package was unlikely to
pass on its own; voters were more likely to support a measure that included investments
in the region's rail system (Evans McDonough Moore Information 2003). So the RTID
Board began to explore a joint ballot initiative with Sound Transit.
The transit agency responded amicably to RTID's proposal for collaboration-
"We would want to continue our dialogue if in the future if it becomes likely that RTID is
taking a regional package to the ballot," the Sound Transit board chair wrote to the
RTID (Ladenburg 2004). But Earl remembers that most Sound Transit board members
were opposed to a joint roads-transit ballot, and although talks with RTID continued,
Sound Transit continued planning to advance its own ballot for a second phase of
transit expansion in the fall election (Earl 2010).
Reformers in the statehouse were pushing hard for a "Regional Transportation
Commission" to force cooperation between RTID and Sound Transit. Tacoma's News
Tribune welcomed the proposed reforms as a way past political impasse:
The politics of transportation in this state have been so dysfunctional... Political
infighting, including bitter rails-vs-roads squabbles in King County, have long kept
the Regional Transportation Investment District from consensus on what projects
to fund... it would be a shame if the Legislature failed to seize this opportunity to
cement a strategic rails-and-roads alliance in the Puget Sound region. (Anon.
2006a).
The Post-Intelligencer was more tentative in its endorsement: "For better or worse, the
legislation links roads to transit in a sink-or-swim-together relationship... Sound Transit
officials were hoping to go to the ballot this year, and may well have their
doubts... But...now it's time to move forward" (Anon. 2006b). According to Earl, the state
had never discussed the proposed alliance with Sound Transit's leadership. So when
Governor Gregoire announced in a press release that she had signed into law a bill
blocking a 2006 transit-only ballot and requiring a joint RTID-Sound Transit ballot
measure in 2007, "People were furious...my staff was devastated" (Earl 2010).
Roads and Transit Ballot Measure (November 2007)
From the start the "shotgun marriage," as it was frequently described in the
press, was a rocky relationship. As the two agencies worked to patch together a joint
$47-billion initiative, Mayor Nickels expressed concern that the highway package was
too broad, arguing that "If it tries to be all things to all parts of the region it's going to
have troubles" (Galloway 2006). Shawn Bunney, RTID Chair jumped to the defense of
the roads spending, "I would be interested in their recommended projects to be
cut.. .The majority of the mega-projects either tie to Seattle or are in the city of Seattle"
(Galloway 2006). King County Executive Ron Sims, former chair of the Sound Transit
board, was initially ambivalent about the merged effort, but as the election approached,
he turned against the initiative, citing both the environmental impact of the roads
expansion and some unnecessary expenses in the light-rail plan.
Meanwhile, the ambitious measure gave fodder to the most fervent opponents of
roads and transit alike. Anti-rail advocates reunited to assault plans for "a crushingly
expensive and inefficient regional light rail system" (Van Dyk 2007a). As the campaign
proceeded, Kemper Freeman and other allies spent $100,000 per week on TV and
radio ads, bombarding voters with the package's price tag, which the anti-rail opposition
estimated at $157 billion. One ad, aired during a popular University of Washington
football game, spelled out the costs against a crimson background: "$157,000,000,000.
Prop one is the biggest local tax increase anywhere in America, ever... Because it costs
so much and does so little, that's why so many people say no to Prop One"
(notoprop1.org 2007; Lindblom 2007a).
For environmentalists, the combined roads and transit package presented more
of a dilemma. Mike O'Brien, chair of the Sierra Club's Cascade Chapter at the time,
recalls the core question for the group, "Can the Sierra club oppose a package that has
rail? This was a very interesting discussion for us. We asked ourselves, 'Will this
package as a whole make global warming worse?"' (Michael O'Brien 2010). The
combined plan included 182 miles of roads, 84 percent of which were general-purpose
lanes (in contrast to HOV or transit-only lanes), and 50 miles of new light rail. The Sierra
Club decided that the heavy emphasis on new highways outweighed the transit
expansion. O'Brien argued passionately in a debate with other environmentalists: "One
hundred and eighty-two miles of roads. They're going to fill up with cars. Look at cities
with great transit. Their roads are still packed.... If we add 182 miles of highway lanes to
our system, we're going to have that much more greenhouse-gas emissions" (O'Brien,
in Strangervideo 2007). So the Sierra Club decided to oppose the initiative. "How could
we tell Sierra Club members to vote for something that would make climate change
worse?" O'Brien (2010) asks.
Most environmental groups took the opposite position, however, maintaining that
the proposed expansion of light rail was too big to pass up. The Transportation Choices
Coalition (TCC) and Futurewise (formerly 1,000 Friends of Washington), led the pro-
transit grassroots campaign in support of Proposition 1. As TCC Director Rob Johnson
argued in a debate among environmental groups,
If we vote yes on this package, the 50 miles of light rail that we build out of this
package are going to totally transform the way we think about land use, the way
we think about density, the way we think about sprawl... If you build light rail, you
get density around those stations. We've got to figure out, if don't build light rail,
where are those people going to go. And guess what, they're going to go to
sprawly, away-from-the-city places without the density and transportation choices
to support their mobility. We're going to see increased greenhouse gas
emissions, and we're going to see a lot more traffic congestion. (Johnson, in
Strangervideo 2007).
TCC concluded that if the measure failed, any future initiative would include less light
rail, and would still expand roads. Moreover, TCC reasoned "We had some levers on
the roads side to be able to stop projects from moving forward, through the NEPA
process, or through lawsuits or through environmental reviews. We could showcase that
there would be problems" (Johnson 2010). So as the election approached,
environmental organizations were campaigning on both sides of Proposition 1.
Unlike the previous transit
ballots, climate change emerged
as a major issue in the public
debate on Proposition 1, largely
as a result of the Sierra Club's
campaign. Between May 2007,
when the Sound Transit board
approved the transit plan for the
ballot, and the election in
November, one-third of the
If we don't act now, summers in
articles about the initiative in the
Post-Intelligencer and Seattle Vote against more highways
Vote NO on RTIDTimes mentioned either climate
change or global warming or N"RI'""r
Figure 5: Materials from Sierra Club's campaigngreenhouse gas emissions. The against the 2007 Proposition 1.
Sierra Club was very deliberate in Source: Notoprop1.org
its public message throughout the campaign. In flyers and newspaper ads, the group
featured polar bears and the vanishing arctic ice cap with the simple message
"Proposition 1 makes global warming worse" (figure 5). A TV ad that aired shortly before
the election delivered this message against time-lapse satellite images of the North
Pole: "In 2007, the Arctic ice cap melted at a record rate. Proposition 1 makes global
warming worse. 182 miles of new highways. 15 million tons of new carbon emissions.
You can do something. Vote No on Proposition 1. There is a better way" (Sierra Club
2007).
Though proponents of the measure also began touting its global-warming
benefits, their message focused more on the costs of inaction. 9 One ad asked, "What
will happen if we turn down the roads and transit measure? Things will only get worse.
More traffic. More congestion. Fewer transit choices. More pollution. We need to
address our transportation problems. Yes on Roads and Transit" (Keep Washington
Rolling 2007).
Though the joint ballot purported to bring the two modes together into one
cohesive plan, press coverage leading up to the election illustrates the intense
polarization between road and transit supporters. Articles criticized the "Anti-car zealots"
and described the "Eight-foot pile of elephant dung that is Sound Transit" (Van Dyk
2007b). Transit activists were somewhat less spiteful toward opponents, but their
disdain for road-building was nonetheless apparent. As Seattle Times columnist and
transit support Danny Wesneat described, "Around here it's like we've jolted back to the
'50s, to relive the allure of the highway era. Last week the state auditor and the editorial
page of my newspaper took turns bashing light rail and saying the answer to our woes
is to build more highways" (Westneat 2007). Just as climate change had surfaced as a
major issue in the campaign, discussions of automobility were growing more frequent in
the media. This explicit treatment of automobility and the climate impact of
transportation in the press illustrate that the transportation problem was no longer
19 For example, Representative Jay Inslee, Democrat from the Eastside, wrote in a Post-Intelligencer
column, "Approving Prop. 1 to expand transit options and unclog traffic bottlenecks is consistent with local
efforts to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions and lead the nation in the fight against global warming" (Inslee
2007).
defined strictly as one of traffic or mobility. While transit opponents in the 1990s could
focus exclusively on sitting in traffic as a compelling storyline to describe the troubles
with transportation, by 2007, their message often included more underlying values
associated with the automobile. As the negative impacts of the automobile were
becoming better understood and frequently discussed, the simple message of traffic
problems was no longer sufficient to compel widespread public support.
On Election Day, the Roads and Transit measure lost by a margin of 56 to 44
percent. A poll conducted for the Sierra Club found that the global-warming message
moved about six percent of the voters, perhaps enough to have swung the election
(Lindblom 2007b). Though taxes and cost were the primary concerns for most voters,
the consultant who conducted the poll described the global warming opponents as "a
new group that played a decisive role" (Lindblom 2007b). But just as important as the
voters the Sierra Club mobilized was the impact on public debate, building widespread
acceptance that transportation and climate are inextricably linked. Mike O'Brien,
reminiscing about the campaign observes that "We didn't really have the idea that we
would defeat it. This was a great opportunity to talk about climate change and
transportation, to frame the discussion. I think we did a pretty good job" (O'Brien 2010).
Joni Earl says she knew the Roads and Transit measure was in trouble in the
final weeks before the election. As she talked with the public in countless campaign
events, people expressed more concern than confidence. The road plan in particular
was less a cohesive proposal than a laundry list of projects, illustrating the clash of
cultures between transit planning-disciplined by elaborate federal grant guidelines to
complete system-wide plans-and highway planning-accustomed to piece-meal
allocation for projects. "It was a kitchen sink, it wasn't a plan" (Earl 2010). The "shot-gun
marriage" mandated by the state promised a new, integrated model for transportation
planning, but did not provide guidance or time to allow two very different agencies to get
to know each other before 'tying the knot.' It is not surprising, therefore that the measure
failed.
Immediately after the election, Sound Transit began gearing up for a new ballot
measure. 'We decided the minute the election was over, we were going to go in the
field, and we were going to get our own research about what happened" (Earl 2010).
The polling suggested that transit stood a better chance of passing on its own, and that
a shorter construction time was more important than price in motivating voters' support.
In addition, the survey indicated that the sales and property taxes were the least popular
finance mechanisms for a transit package (supported by 23 percent and 22 percent
respectively), outranked by car tabs (51 percent), tolling (49 percent), and gas taxes (42
percent) (Roberts 2007). Car tabs, however, had been eliminated by Eyman as a future
revenue source, while gas taxes were constitutionally mandated to fund only roads
projects. And in contrast to the implications of the poll, policy-makers consider tolling to
be politically risky (Howard 2010). Thus despite its relative unpopularity, the sales tax
would remain the sole local revenue source for Sound Transit's next ballot measure.
Sound Transit Il Ballot Measure (November 2008)
The board quickly got to work crafting a plan that could be put in place more
quickly. Unlike previous years, Sound Transit developed two preliminary proposals,
which differed in scope and taxing levels, and circulated them for public feedback on the
agency's website and in community meetings. Both packages reflected much of the
voters' preferences suggested by the post-election survey: they projected12 years of
construction time (compared to 20 for Roads and Transit) and cost just a fraction of the
$47 billion package of 2007.
As the 2008 Sound Transit plan came together, the press coverage of advocates
on either side of the measure was notably more subdued than it had been the previous
year. Perhaps because media attention was focused on other, high-profile races (the
presidential contest, Governor Gregoire's re-election bid, the latest Eyman initiative), the
press portrayed fewer virulent attacks over the initiative. Though not devoid of all
gibes-one commentator, for example, described light rail as a "cult-like cause" while
another criticized the "entrenched ignorance, inertia and obstructionism" of rail
opponents (Connelly 2008; Clarke 2008)-the debate was generally more civil.
Freeman was an active member of the opposition campaign, participating in a televised
debate with Greg Nickels, for example, and contributing heavily to the advertising
campaign. But the core of his message-the plan costs too much and does too little-
was, in its fourth iteration, beginning to sound tired. Even the opposition's television ad
was recycled from the previous year, with an identical theme and very similar message.
Nonetheless, Earl recalls fierce political debate leading to the plan's adoption by
the board. Regional and modal tensions again came to the fore, as Snohomish county
representatives argued that the draft plan short-changed their county with too little light
rail. Meanwhile, Bellevue activists maintained that voters could not support the measure
unless a detailed alignment through the Eastside was defined. And King County
Executive Ron Sims, long supporter of light rail, reversed course and argued
vehemently that the plan should invest in "more immediate solutions such as expanded
bussing" (Roberts and Sztajno 2008). A more general concern among the board was
about the timing of the ballot. Many argued adamantly that asking voters for a tax
increase in the midst of a prolonged recession was folly, while others suggested holding
off on the election until light-rail service-scheduled to open from downtown Seattle to
SeaTac the following year-could demonstrate Sound Transit's success. Greg Nickels,
now Sound Transit's board chair, however, was adamant that the new initiative be
placed on the 2008 ballot, in another presidential election year. "We didn't need to learn
that lesson over again" (Nickels 2010).
As Earl recalls, most members supported moving the plan to the ballot, but no
one wanted to be the twelfth (and decisive) vote. Less than a month before the vote on
the draft plan, only nine of the eighteen Board members had committed to voting yes,
kicking off what Earl describes as "two weeks of some of the most intense politics...
Greg Nickels was calling everyone to gain support to go to the ballot, and I was meeting
with them, trying to broker between them" (Earl 2010). On July 24th, 2008, after several
last-minute amendments-including an immediate expansion of regional bus service,
and further investments in light rail and HOV ramps in Snohomish County "if sufficient
additional funding and/or cost savings are identified"-the Board voted 16-2 to approve
the transit system plan(Sound Transit 2008c). And with a second, unanimous vote, the
plan was scheduled for the November election.
The ballot measure proposed adding the following to the Sound Move system
plan: 36 miles of light rail with 19 new stations, south from SeaTac Airport to
Redondo/Star Lake, east from Seattle across the 1-90 Bridge through Bellevue to
Overlake, and north from Nothgate to Lynnwood in Snohomish County (Figure 6). In
addition, the proposal included commuter
rail system improvements, with a 65
percent capacity expansion between
Seattle and Tacoma, 100,000 hours of
increased express bus service in the
region's most trafficked corridors, and a
feasibility study of passenger rail on the
Eastside 1-405 corridor. The package
would be completed in 15 years and
increase the sales tax in the transit
district 0.5 percent (an estimated $125
annual expense for an average
household), for a total cost of $17.8
billion.
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management and climate change. A
preface to the plan, printed against a backdrop of the region's beloved Mount Rainier
warns: "Another one million people are expected to call this region home in the next 25
years. That's about a 30 percent increase in population and is more than the current
combined populations of Seattle, Bellevue, Everett and Tacoma" (Sound Transit
2008a). The introduction then describes that the growth jeopardizes the region's
Everett
seilevue
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economy and threatens the environment if nothing is done. And in a detailed appendix,
the plan compares the system's estimated carbon impact to other alternatives, and
outlines the land use-climate change connection. As the plan summarizes,
Overall, the ST2 Plan represents an important step towards addressing the
challenge of global warming by offering a reliable alternative to motor vehicle
travel. The ST2 Plan will reduce vehicle miles traveled on our region's roadways
which in turn reduces greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide.... In
addition, the ST2 Plan fosters transit-oriented development around stations,
helping provide for compact, urban, sustainable communities that have relatively
smaller carbon footprints. (Sound Transit 2008b).
Earl attributes the plan's emphasis on climate change in part to the persistence
of the Sierra Club. "We were the first plan in the country that did a greenhouse gas
emissions analysis at a programmatic level. That was something the Sierra Club asked
for" (Earl 2010). The climate impact of transportation permeated much of the media
coverage during lead-up to the election, though without the pointed campaign
messaging evident the previous year. As one reader wrote, "Sound Transit's
Proposition 1 is all about taking a big step beyond oil dependency, toward regional
transportation based on renewable energy. A transit backbone of electrical light rail will
be the key to getting around for a lot more people as climate catastrophes and gas
prices accelerate over the next decade" (Burkhardt 2008). Nickels was frequently
quoted in the press pushing the global warming benefits of the plan. As a Post-
Intelligencer article described Nickel's concern that "we will have to start living and
working closer together so we pollute less" (Lange 2008b). Less than a month before
the election, a study commissioned by Sound Transit estimated the light-rail expansion
could generate substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions based on "how
transit leads to more compact developments that reduce use of cars" (Lange 2008a).
Though the report projected that the light rail system could cut car and truck travel by
nearly a third, the clear emphasis in the media coverage was on greenhouse
emissions-a notable departure from the fixation on traffic impact in the earliest transit
ballots.
Similarly, a growing number of articles illustrated that automobile dependence
was no longer assumed without question. Sierra Club supporters again joined the
campaign in support of Sound Transit, though this time their message was less
pointedly about global warming emissions but focused more generally on automobility.
"The new station areas...have the potential to transform the way we live by creating
sustainable living centers around transit hubs where people can walk, bike or take
transit to meet most of their daily needs. This will require Sound Transit to work with
local government, neighborhoods and developers to create a future where we reduce
our reliance on cars and expensive gas" (Mike O'Brien and Gould 2008). After a Seattle
Times editorial claimed that "Most people don't want to get out of their cars," several
readers wrote to criticize the paper's position. "Actually, most people don't want to make
themselves-and others-dependent on their cars and on being stuck in traffic,"
countered Seattle resident Mitch Gitman. Another resident wrote "Sound Transit's
Proposition 1 is all about taking a big step beyond oil dependency, toward regional
transportation based on renewable energy. A transit backbone of electrical light rail will
be the key to getting around for a lot more people as climate catastrophes and gas
prices accelerate over the next decade" (Rosenthal 2008).
Thus by the 2008 ballot measure, automobility was not always assumed without
question in the public debate. Some of this shift in the debate arguably could be
attributed to the Sierra Club's 2007 pointed campaign messaging, as the link between
climate and transportation was reiterated. But more generally, the inclusion of
automobility and climate change in the public transportation debate was likely the result
of the increasing acceptance of climate change as problem. Rob Johnson describes this
effect: "As those issues [of greenhouse gas emissions] started to creep to the front page
of the papers, climate change started to become a part of our collective conscience. As
data started to come to light, it was clear that a lot of our emissions came from things
like transportation. So that's when it started to become a bigger issue" (Johnson 2010).
On Election Day, voters overwhelmingly approved the Sound Transit 2
expansion, with 58 percent support throughout the district, and margins higher than 65
percent in Seattle. Of the three counties, only Pierce rejected the measure with just 46
percent of voters' support. For Earl, the victory was particularly poignant given that the
impact of the nation's economic recession was already sharply felt in the region. "Every
day was more bad news" (Earl 2010). A month before the election, Washington Mutual,
a national bank headquartered in Seattle collapsed, casting a gloomy shadow over the
region's economic future. But "voters wanted our product," and were motivated by the
"compelling regional vision" for a robust transit system, so Sound Transit 2 was a
success (Earl 2010). For O'Brien, the election signaled "a new reality...that the age
when we can get around exclusively by car is over" (Lange 2008c).
Epilogue
Light rail service opened between SeaTac and downtown Seattle in 2009, on
time and $100 million under budget (Earl 2010). Despite the success story of Sound
Transit's nearly twenty-year struggle for light rail, many of the biggest disputes-the
contest between transit and the car, competition between cities in the region, the use of
state and local finance-today threaten other important regional transportation projects.
Though inching toward resolution, planning for both the 520 bridge and the Alaskan
Way Viaduct replacement has been engulfed in political debate, with disputes in both
cases about the relationship between roads and transit and the competing interests of
different jurisdictions. In 2009, Greg Nickels lost his bid for re-election in a primary upset
by Sierra Club activist Mike McGinn. In the same election, Mike O'Brien was elected to
the City Council. Transportation and climate change were key themes for both
candidates, as debates about the Alaskan Way Viaduct raged between advocates
pushing for a new underground highway and those arguing for the highway's removal.
Meanwhile, 40 bridges remain in critical need of repair, and the state estimates an
increasing gap in revenues for basic road maintenance as the gas tax diminishes.
Establishing light rail and the other elements of the Sound Transit system is an
enormous step forward for the Seattle region, and the shift in public debate observed
over the course of the 20-year planning process gives hope that climate change impact
has become a necessary consideration in any serious transportation dialogue. The
region's other looming transportation problems present both opportunities and
challenges to build from the lessons of Sound Transit's experience to achieve a more
sustainable transportation system.
Conclusions
Despite the increasing prevalence of climate change and automobility in
arguments about transportation, traffic congestion remains the problem most frequently
considered in transportation debates. This is no surprise; cars are still the overwhelming
mode of choice for most people in the U.S., and sitting in traffic is a frustrating, wasteful
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and expensive experience. The challenge for sustainability activists-one that Seattle
environmentalists rose to admirably-is to ensure that traffic does not remain the
primary rationale for transportation decision-making. Instead considerations like land-
use, climate change and social equity must be included in balanced transportation
planning and debates.
Though rapid-transit planning in Seattle often resulted in polarized debates
between advocates for roads and advocates for trains, an emerging policy
recommendation supported by some participants on both sides gives hope that the
divergent interests are not completely irreconcilable. Road tolling should be considered
by policy makers both as a local revenue source and a transportation demand
management approach. It is a promising strategy in its potential to appeal to the most
vocal participants in current transportation debates. Rail-transit opponents, like Kemper
Freeman, espouse a belief system that values freedom of mobility and prefers market-
based solutions over government regulation. Tolling, therefore, is an amenable policy
because it reduces traffic congestion through market mechanisms. On the other hand,
some environmentalists support tolling as a means to reduce driving. There are some
important sustainability considerations in the implementation of tolling. First, to ensure
adequate mobility for people who are unable to pay the added cost of road tolls, robust,
affordable alternatives to driving must exist. Second, a significant portion of revenues
generated through tolls should be dedicated to alternatives modes to the car, like
transit, biking, and walking. Finally, when tolling and other transportation measures can
achieve lasting reductions in traffic volumes, planers should consider reducing road
capacity.
In addition to finance issues, several governance concerns are illustrated by the
Sound Transit case. First, ballot initiatives present both challenges and opportunities for
sustainable transportation planning. By forcing public debate about transportation, ballot
measures can have a positive impact by propelling new issues of public concern into
the decision-making process. The roads-and-transit ballot measure, for example moved
the issue of climate change more squarely into the debate about highway expansion.
On the other hand, ballot measures are likely to remain a popular tool for transit
opponents and other foes of environmental protection to undermine progress toward
sustainability. Similarly, transportation projects that require local tax increases will
continue to rely on direct democracy for authorization. So sustainable transportation
advocates must be able to engage effectively in electoral politics. For public officials in
the Sound Transit case, this was accomplished when agency leaders acted deliberately
to build grassroots support, reaching out to natural allies like environmental
organizations. It was also facilitated by the strong public confidence Sound Transit was
eventually able to garner through its commitment to accountability and transparency.
Advocacy groups were most successful in initiative campaigns when they were able to
tell a consistent and compelling story, utilizing salient issues like climate change, to
frame the political debate.
The preponderance of transportation-ballot measures, however, (at least 16
between 1995 and 2008) overwhelms the capacity of voters, advocacy organizations
and public agencies to engage in thoughtful dialogue about critical transportation
issues, and erodes public confidence in the ability of public officials to make decisions.
Though not utilized in Sound Transit's development, advisory ballot measures should be
considered a tool of last resort by planners and policy makers.
The Sound Transit case also illustrates the many challenges in moving from a
victory at the ballot box to implementation of the voters' mandate. Again cultivating
public trust through effective leadership and communication will help make these
challenges easier. But another important consideration is the difference between the
simplified issues utilized as rhetorical devices in electoral politics and the intense and
nuanced interests involved in on-the-ground political disputes. Issues of land use
provide a helpful example. As Transportation Choices Coalitions director Rob Johnson
describes, "We despise sprawl, but we hate density. There's a big disconnect between
what we want. What we haven't done a very good job of as a region is talking about
what density really means, what the positive vision of density looks like" (Rob Johnson
2010). In the Sound Transit ballot measure campaigns, growth management was often
described as a positive benefit of rail transit. But as Sound Transit and the City of
Seattle have begun to implement the vision for compact urban villages surrounding new
train stations, some neighborhood activists are resisting change. Seattle can build on its
strong traditions of both neighborhood and sustainability planning to help navigate these
challenges. Indeed, the city has launched an effort to update neighborhood plans to
reflect the new reality of light-rail. As light-rail service is extended outside of Seattle, the
city can serve as a model for others in the region by identifying some best practices and
key lessons as it tackles the issues in these neighborhood disputes.
Seattle's ability to lead other cities in the region depends on its relationships with
these other jurisdictions. The experience of regional collaboration in the Sound Transit
case, however, illustrates the many tensions among cities. Unless higher-order
governments can intervene to mediate relationships between jurisdictions, the intense
competition between cities presents a barrier to regional cooperation. Though far from
ideal, political compromises like the sub-area equity policy may be the only way to hold
regional alliances together. It is possible that the state, represented by the Washington
Department of Transportation (WSDOT) on the Sound Transit Board, could have served
as an effective mediator among cities. WSDOT's historical legacy as a highway builder,
however, makes the agency an unlikely leader in this role. Finally, at their core, regional
tensions were about competition over limited funded. If the federal government were to
provide a greater share of funding for transit projects, regional tensions could be eased.
Though not elaborated in this thesis, the Sound Transit governance structure
was one element that helped to hold the regional collaboration together. Elected officials
from the transit district are appointed to Sound Transit's board by County Executives,
and each county's representation is proportional to its population. Major agreements,
like approving a transit plan, can only be made with super-majority support of at least 12
of the 18 members. This particular aspect was deliberately designed so that no one city
or county can dominate. Seattle, despite its power as the biggest city in the state, does
not hold a super majority of seats on the board-nor does King County-and therefore
the city cannot control Sound Transit decision-making by veto. In addition, to help
integrate Sound Transit's planning and service delivery with that of local agencies, one-
half of all appointments in each county must serve on the board of a local transit
agency. This is an innovative policy, though further analysis is necessary to determine
the extent to which it accomplishes its intended objective.
A third important aspect of the structure of Sound Transit's board is that
members are appointed not elected. At several points during Sound Transit's
development, political leaders, journalists and residents have called for democratic
elections for Sound Transit's board of directors. Given the success of transit foes like
Tim Eyman and Kemper Freeman in captivating the public debate around transportation
issues, such recommendations should be carefully considered. Joni Earl points out that
Sound Transit board members join the board because they believe in the agency's
mission. This does not imply, however, that the board is uncritical; reviewing fifteen
years of board meeting minutes and documents reveals that the board consistently
engaged in substantive debates and conducted detailed analysis around all its major
(and often minor) decisions. By filling its board through political appointment rather than
electoral process, Sound Transit has enjoyed the consistency of leadership and the
protection against manipulation by transit opponents necessary to withstand its many
challenges. Nonetheless, because democratic representation is valued for good
reason, this issue of governance in regional transit agencies warrants further study. A
comparative analysis of Sound Transit and Metro in Portland, Oregon could be
illustrative.
Finally, the U.S. Congress is preparing to reauthorize the federal transportation
act, presenting an opportunity to consider changes to the level of funding, the relative
amount allocated to different modes, and the criteria for awarding grants. Sound Transit
has fared relatively well in securing federal support, thanks to an effect. It should be
noted, however, that Sound Transit's success has come at other agencies' expense.
Transit projects in other cities that have failed to win federal support are not necessarily
less important than light-rail in Seattle. Federal granting, therefore, should not pit transit
projects against each other, but should instead evaluate projects on their own merits
and relative to goals established by the project's local community. Similarly, roads
funding should be given equal treatment, and evaluated based on criteria that reflect
both sustainability objectives and integration with regional transportation plans.
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